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Abstract
We explore conditions under which a multiproduct firm can profitably turn itself into a platform
by “hosting rivals,” i.e. by inviting rivals to sell products or services on top of its core product.
Hosting eliminates the additional shopping costs to consumers of buying a specialist rival’s com-
peting version of the multiproduct firm’s non-core product. On the one hand, this makes it easier
for the rival to compete on the non-core product. On the other hand, hosting turns the rival from
a pure competitor into a complementor: the value added by its product now helps raise consumer
demand for the multi-product firm’s core product. As a result, hosting can be both unilaterally
profitable for the multi-product firm and jointly profitable for both firms.
JEL classification: D4, L1, L5
Keywords: multi-sided platforms, shopping costs, bundling, competition, complementarity.
1 Introduction
Recently a lot of attention has been given to multi-sided platforms such as those operated by Airbnb,
Alibaba, eBay, Expedia, Facebook and Tencent, to name a few. In part, this reflects that many of the
most valuable companies in the world today generate a lot of their revenue from platform businesses,
focusing on facilitating interactions or transactions between different parties (e.g. buyers and sellers)
rather than selling products or services that they own or produce themselves.
∗We thank Patrick Rey and Alex White for very helpful comments, as well as participants at 44th EARIE in Maas-
tricht, the Online Platform Competition Conference at the University of Florida Gainesville, 16th ZEW Conference on
ICT in Mannheim, and the 2018 platform research symposium at Boston University. Gunhaeng Lee and Tat-How Teh
provided excellent research assistance. The financial support of the European Research Council (ERC) under the Euro-
pean Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 670494) and Singapore Ministry of
Education Social Science Research Thematic Grant (MOE2017-SSRTG-023) is gratefully acknowledged.
†Boston University Questrom School of Business. E-mail: ahagiu@bu.edu
‡Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS, Toulouse. E-mail: bruno.jullien@tse-fr.eu.
§Department of Economics, National University of Singapore. E-mail: jwright@nus.edu.sg
1
However, in many cases, existing product (or service) companies have the potential to become
(multi-sided) platforms too. The most straightforward way for a product company to do so is by
inviting third parties to sell their products or services on top of the original product the company
already sells. Two well-known and successful examples are Apple’s iPhone and Salesforce’s customer
relationship management (CRM) software. After launching the iPhone in June 2007 as a stand-alone
product running exclusively Apple produced apps, Apple quickly realized it would benefit from the
creativity of third-party developers. As a result, in July 2008 the company opened up the iPhone
to third-parties (including those producing rival apps) and created the App Store. Salesforce was
founded in 1999 as a seller of CRM software products to small-to-medium-size businesses. In 2005,
the company created a platform (Force.com) and an app marketplace (AppExchange) around its
offering, which allows third-party software developers to build and sell other software to Salesforce’s
CRM customers. Today there are over one million Force.com registered developers and over 2,500
apps offered on AppExchange.
When the third-party products are complementary (or unrelated) to the original product, the
benefits of inviting them to sell on top of the original product are obvious. However, some of the
third-party products may actually be (partial) substitutes to the original product, in which case the
benefit of “hosting” the third-parties is not so obvious. This motivates our paper, which explores the
conditions under which hosting a third-party that produces a rival product or service can be profitable.
In our view, there are many potential opportunities for existing companies to turn themselves into
platforms by hosting rivals. Many of these opportunities are hypothetical for the time being, since
the firms involved have yet to explore them. There are, nonetheless, a good number of cases where
existing firms have successfully completed or at least embarked on the transition. In the two examples
mentioned above, Apple allows some apps which compete with functionality already existing in the
iPhone: e.g. Google Maps competes with Apple Maps, Google Chrome competes with the Apple’s
Safari browser which is pre-installed. Salesforce’s AppExchange allows customers to purchase some
third-party apps that directly compete with functionality included in Salesforce’s CRM product: e.g.
Survey Monkey, GetFeedback and QuestionPro compete for consumer surveys, or CongaGrid and
GridBuddy for data management.
Similarly, consider Intuit, the seller of QuickBooks, which is the leading software for accounting,
financial management and tax compliance for small businesses in the United States. Over the past
seven years, Intuit has progressively turned QuickBooks into a multi-sided platform. Specifically, the
company opened up application-programming interfaces, created a developer program, and launched
an app store, all of which allow third-party developers to build and sell software products to Quick-
Books’ customer base. Today, the platform offers QuickBooks customers around 1,400 apps.1 Some of
these products compete with features already included in QuickBooks: for instance, third-party pay-
roll management apps such as TimeTracker and TimeRewards are direct substitutes for Intuit’s own
Tsheets. Intuit has also created QuickBooks Capital, a marketplace where both Intuit and a number
1See “How Intuit Reinvents Itself” in Fortune, October 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/10/20/how-intuit-reinvents-
itself/
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of selected third-party lenders can offer loans to QuickBooks customers. Intuit negotiates attractive
rates with the third-party lenders and makes it easier for QuickBooks customers to apply for loans
directly from QuickBooks by directly providing the relevant information to lenders.2
In many countries Cable and satellite TV providers have allowed Netflix to sell to their subscribers
through their own platforms, even though Netflix competes with the cable companies’ video-on-demand
services.3 In the financial sector, a European company named “Deposit Solutions” is facilitating the
movement of banking to a platform model. Deposit Solutions provides a software infrastructure that
allows banks to offer third party deposit products to their own customers through their existing
accounts. As an example, Deutsche Bank offers its German account holders the chance to access fixed
deposits of selected rival banks through its “ZinsMarkt”.
Gyms provide a more “physical” example. Recently, some “big box gyms” have begun renting out
space in their facilities to specialty studios, where the latter can offer classes to the gym’s members. For
instance, the New York Sports Club (NYSC) hosts cycling classes offered by Cyc Fitness, a boutique
cycling studio, within several of the NYSC’s gym locations in New York City.4 Country clubs work
in a similar way, sometimes hosting third-parties that provide classes or specialized services to the
clubs’ members (e.g. swimming or tennis coaching), where these were previously (or sometimes still
are) provided by the clubs.
We provide a simple model which captures some of the key tradeoffs that arise when a firm decides
whether to turn itself into a platform by hosting a (partial) competitor. In the model there is a
multiproduct firm M that provides two types of products A and B, and a specialized firm S that just
offers a superior version of B. There are two types of consumers, some who just want product A and
some who want both products. Consumers incur a shopping cost of going to each firm, and have the
option to go to both (i.e. multi-stop shop). In this model, if M “hosts” S, it means that consumers
can go to M and buy any subset of product A, M ’s version of product B and S’s version of product
B, while incurring the shopping cost only once.
Modelling a platform as arising endogenously to save customers’ shopping costs captures a funda-
mental role played by real-world platforms, which is to provide a common infrastructure that allows
multiple products or services to be produced and/or sold to customers. Our focus is then on the
strategic interaction between the potential platform owner and the specialized firm, which determines
whether or not the multiproduct firm will indeed become a platform.
By eliminating the additional shopping cost consumers incur when they wish to buy A from M
and B from S, hosting eliminates M ’s ability to price discriminate across the two types of consumers.
Essentially, when S is hosted, M unbundles the A and B products, so hosting turns competition for
the market into competition within the market. This means M can no longer make a profit by selling
B, given that S offers a superior version of B and the firms now compete on a level playing field in
B. On the other hand, hosting allows M to potentially gain by raising its price on product A because
2See https://quickbooks.intuit.com/capital/
3For instance, Sky’s Sky Q service in the UK and Italy provides users access to Internet video and music services
(YouTube, Netflix and Spotify) that compete with Sky Q’s own offerings.
4https://www.newyorksportsclubs.com/cyc
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shopping costs are now taken care of by the surplus offered by S’s superior version of B. In this sense,
hosting allows M to gain by turning a substitute into a complement. This logic extends to the joint
profit perspective, which becomes relevant when the two firms can make lump-sum transfers to each
other under hosting. Taking into account both firms’ profits expands the region of parameters where
hosting dominates, but the tradeoff and its underlying logic remain.
If we also allow for the possibility that M can monitor S’s transactions under hosting and charge
a variable (per transaction) fee, then hosting always dominates non-hosting from a joint profit per-
spective in the absence of fixed hosting costs. The reason is that the variable fee provides a new
instrument for M to extract surplus from consumers who buy S’s superior version of B. Although it
is constrained by outside competition, this instrument is sufficient to make up for the loss of its ability
to price discriminate using the price of its own version of B under hosting.
Non-hosting can dominate from a joint profit perspective even if M can charge a variable fee and
even in the absence of fixed hosting costs once we allow for the possibility that some consumers are
not aware of the specialist’s existence. If the number of these consumers is sufficiently high, they
can result in competition being softened in the absence of hosting as M focuses more on exploiting
uninformed consumers than just competing for informed consumers. On the other hand, if uninformed
consumers learn of S’s existence and prices whenever they visit M , the firms’ profits under hosting do
not change compared to the full-information setting. Thus, firms may prefer not to host in order to
prevent too many consumers becoming informed about their rivals.
Finally, we discuss the factors that determine the optimal number of specialist to host when there
are multiple competing specialists.
2 Related literature
Our paper relates to several strands of literature.
Some existing papers have analyzed the tradeoff between the platform business model and more
traditional alternatives: marketplace vs. reseller in Hagiu and Wright (2015a), platform vs. vertically
integrated firm in Hagiu and Wright (2015b and 2018), agency vs. wholesale pricing in Abhishek
et al. (2016) and Johnson (2017). In these papers, the main difference between the platform and
the traditional business model is the allocation of control over the key factors that are relevant for
customers (e.g. prices, marketing decisions, product delivery, etc.). A distinction relative to the
current paper is that this literature does not allow the same product or service to be offered by the
firm in competition with its agents (suppliers or professionals). Thus, this strand of literature does
not address the issue of a “traditional” firm hosting rivals to become a platform, the central question
of the current paper.
Somewhat closer is the literature discussing a firm’s decision to open itself up to third-party de-
velopers. The key issues that this literature has focused on are how much technology to share with
platform participants (Boudreau, 2010, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2018, Niculescu et al., 2018), whether
to make a piece of software open source (August et. al, 2013 and 2018), and whether a firm should
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become a “platform” and collaborate with producers of complementary products (Mantovani and
Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016). In these papers, the main benefit of opening up to third-parties is to encour-
age innovation and contributions by outside developers or complementors, who are not rivals of the
platform. The current paper is different in that it shows “opening up” can make sense even if the
third-parties are rivals.
While our focus is on the question whether a firm should host a rival, a related but different
question is whether, conditional on hosting, the platform would want to offer (and possibly bundle)
its own inferior version of the hosted product, even though no one will buy it in equilibrium. This is
the focus of Carlton et al. (2010), who show that bundling the inferior version of the complementary
product reduces consumer’s willingness to pay for that product and thereby allows the platform to
extract higher profits from the sale of its primary product. Another key difference is that in Carlton
et al. (2010) the two products are strict complements, whereas in our model, they are independent
and only become complements due to shopping costs.
There is a small literature studying whether a platform that caters to third-party providers should
offer its own products/services. For example, Hagiu and Spulber (2013) study a platform’s incentive to
introduce first-party content alongside third-party content. They show that doing so can be beneficial
in mitigating the chicken-and-egg problem coordination problem in user participation. Zhu and Liu
(2018) study this question in the context of Amazon, showing empirically that Amazon is more likely
to compete with its marketplace sellers in product categories that are more successful (in terms of
sales). Relative to these papers, the current paper does the reverse: it studies whether a product firm
should introduce third-party sellers on its own platform. Moreover, neither of these papers models
platforms as reducing shopping costs. Somewhat closer is White (2013), where, in order to reduce
shopping costs and raise consumer participation, a platform chooses to allow non-paying competitors
in its organic search results, even though these compete with paying advertisers.
To some extent, the platform as modeled in our paper can be viewed as a vertically integrated firm
that uses the upstream input (product A in our model) to offer downstream products (the product A
and the various versions of product B). The vertically integrated firm can consider selling access to
its upstream facility to rival downstream firms (S in our model). The literature on vertical foreclosure
has studied incentives to provide such access when the upstream facility is essential for downstream
firms to sell in the downstream market and when the upstream firm charges tariffs to the downstream
firms for access (see Rey and Tirole, 2007, for a summary). Our setting is different in several respects.
First, and most importantly, the platform (i.e. access to product A) is not essential, so the hosted firm
can still sell outside the platform. Second, hosting does not reduce S’s cost in our model, but rather
allows consumers to save on shopping costs. Third, the firm providing the platform is a multiproduct
provider with market power in both goods. Because of the shopping cost, hosting transforms the
competing specialist firms into complementors to the monopolized good (product A), whereas in a
standard vertical setting, access to the input increases competition. For this reason, hosting may be
profitable even without financial compensation from the hosted firm or any wholesale contract.
The empirical study of Facebook’s integration of Instagram by Li and Agarwal (2017) has a similar
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flavour of turning a rival into a complementor, but this is done through outright acquisition. By
contrast, when a platform hosts a rival in the current paper, the rival maintains pricing autonomy (or
more generally other forms of control)—this autonomy is fundamental to being a platform as opposed
to a vertically integrated firm. Furthermore, the key driving force in Li and Agarwal (2017) is the
consumption complementarity between Facebook and Instagram, whereas in the current paper it is the
shopping cost saving. In a similar vein, Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne (2011) interpret vertical
integration decisions by platforms as bundling, which increases convenience for users. Although the
bundling theme is similar to our paper, they focus on bundling with complementors, not with rivals.
At a high level, the profitability of helping a rival by hosting them seems related to the literatures
on raising rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1983) and second sourcing (Farrell and Gallini, 1988).
However, hosting in our paper is closer to reducing a rival’s costs rather than raising them. And the
mechanism which makes hosting profitable in our model does not rely on a commitment to have more
competition, which is the main driver behind second sourcing.
Our paper is also related to the literature on compatibility between system components sold by
different firms. In particular, Matutes and Regibeau (1988) have shown that compatibility between
components from various firms may relax competition between systems. In our model, hosting also
makes it easier for consumers to buy from multiple firms, but the products are independent. Hosting
then intensifies competition on one good while relaxing the competitive pressure on the other one.
Finally, our paper belongs to a burgeoning economics literature which explores the implications
of competition with multiproduct firms when, due to shopping costs, consumers have a demand for
one-stop shopping. In this literature, like our paper, different products sold at the same firm become de
facto complementary to one another due to consumers wanting to save on shopping costs. Important
early contributions to this literature are Lal and Matutes (1989, 1994), and Chen and Rey (2012).
Lal and Matutes (1989) study the pricing equilibrium in a game with two competing stores, each
selling two products, and in which a fraction of consumers have an inherent preference to buy both
products from the same store (in order to save on shopping costs). Lal and Matutes (1994) builds on
the same model by allowing consumers to be imperfectly informed about prices (stores can advertise
some of their prices but not others). It shows that imperfect information about prices can lead to
loss-leader pricing strategies. Chen and Rey (2012) takes this analysis one step further, showing that
even under perfect information about prices, loss-leader pricing can be a profitable strategy for a large
store competing with a smaller one (i.e. a store offering a narrower range of products). None of these
papers allows for a firm (store) to “host” the competitor’s product(s), which is the focus of our paper.
More recent works such as those by Zhou (2014) and Rhodes and Zhou (2018) have focused on the
implications of one-stop shopping for pricing, bundling and product range decisions in search contexts.
We are the first to focus on the implications of one-stop shopping for hosting a rival’s product.
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3 Model
We start with a simple benchmark model. There are two types of products, A and B. Suppose there is
a multiproduct firm M that offers both product A and its version of B, denoted BM , and a specialized
firm S that just offers its version of product B, denoted BS . This means product A is monopolized
by M while product B can be supplied by M or S. We normalize both firms’ costs to zero. To keep
things concrete, we will illustrate the model setup with the gym example described earlier. Thus, A
can be thought of as the gym’s core offering that is included in the membership, and B as a specialized
class that can be offered by the gym M or by a specialist firm S (i.e. Cyc).
The total measure of consumers is normalized to one. Among them, there are two types. A fraction
λA > 0 of consumers just want to purchase one unit of A and are not interested in B (i.e. they value
both versions of B at zero). In the gym example, these are consumers who just want to use the gym’s
core facilities and are not interested in specialized classes. We call these monoproduct consumers
“A-type” consumers. The remaining fraction λB > 0 (which equals 1−λA) of consumers obtain value
from both A and B, and so are interested in purchasing one unit of each. We call these multiproduct
consumers “B-type” consumers. All consumers value product A at uA > 0.
5 The B-types value BM
at uB > 0 and BS at uS = uB + ∆, where ∆ ≥ 0. Thus, B-types view BS as superior to BM .6 Note
that A and B are not complementary products—B-types can consume one or both of them without
changing the utilities derived from each.
All consumers incur a shopping cost σ > 0 when going to each firm, regardless of how many
products they buy from it. Thus, if consumers go to both M and S (i.e. multi-stop shop), they will
incur σ twice. Consumers can always purchase an outside option which gives them a payoff normalized
to zero. Throughout the paper we assume that
σ < min {uA, uB} ,
i.e. the shopping cost is low enough that M could potentially sell either product alone. We also make
the additional assumption that
∆ ≤ σ,
i.e. the shopping cost exceeds the added value of S’s product BS . This implies that without hosting,
M can have an advantage in selling product B, provided it makes it attractive for consumers to want
to buy A. In Section 4.4, we briefly discuss what happens in the less interesting case in which ∆ > σ.
5In Section A of the Online Appendix we relax this assumption to allow positive or negative correlation between the
values different types of consumers place on products A and B, showing the benchmark tradeoff between hosting and
non-hosting is similar.
6Our results do not depend crucially on the assumption that B-type consumers are all the same. In Section B of the
Online Appendix, we consider the variation of our baseline model in which B-type consumers have heterogeneous tastes
over products BM and BS , and obtain a similar tradeoff between hosting and non-hosting.
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4 Benchmark results
In this section we analyze the above model, first in the case without hosting (Section 4.1), and then in
the case when M hosts S, so that consumers can buy A and BS at M without incurring the shopping
cost twice (Section 4.2). We then determine M ’s incentives to host S, first without any transfers or
fees (Section 4.3), next when a lump-sum transfer payment can be made between the firms as part of
the hosting contract (Section 4.4) and finally, when M can monitor transactions using S and so can
use both a lump-sum transfer and variable fees in the hosting contract (Section 4.5).
4.1 Without hosting
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium that arises without hosting, i.e. consumers must go to
S if they want to buy BS . In the gym example, this means that Cyc Fitness only sells classes in its
own studios, whereas the NYSC offers its own cycling classes in its gyms.
Consider first A-type consumers who are only interested in A. If M charges a price of pA, these
consumers will buy A provided pA ≤ uA − σ. Now consider B-types. If M charges a price of pB and
S charges a price pS , they have five options:
• buy A only, obtaining utility uA − pA
• buy A and BM , obtaining utility uA + uB − pA − pB − σ
• buy A and BS , obtaining utility uA + uB + ∆− pA − pS − 2σ
• buy BM only, obtaining utility uB − pB − σ
• buy BS only, obtaining utility uB + ∆− pS − σ
Because the shopping cost σ outweighs S’s added value in product B (i.e. ∆), there is a unique
equilibrium outcome in which M makes all the sales.7 Formal proofs for this result and others are
provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 In the baseline model without hosting there is a unique equilibrium outcome in which
prices are p∗A = uA − σ, p∗B = σ − ∆, p∗S = 0. All A-type consumers purchase A, and all B-type
consumers buy A and BM from M . Profits are pi
∗
M = uA − σ + λB (σ −∆) and pi∗S = 0.
Some comments are in order. In equilibrium, B-types choose to buy both products from M
because (i) avoiding the additional shopping cost σ of multi-stop shopping is worth more to B-types
than getting the higher utility from S’s better version of B, and (ii) getting the additional utility from
A is worth more to B-types than getting the higher utility from S’s better version of B. Furthermore,
M ’s equilibrium prices for A and BM are such that the net surplus B-types derive from buying A and
7Strictly speaking, there are other equilibria, in which p∗S < 0. We rule out such equilibria because they involve S
setting a price that it would prefer to change if some consumers actually purchased from it (i.e. off the equilibrium path).
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BM exactly matches the surplus they get from the two next best alternatives: buying A from M and
BS from S, or buying only BS from S. Note that S’s presence constrains the amount that M can
extract from selling its two products to B-types to uA −∆.
Given that B-types buy both products from M , M collects pA from A-types and pA + pB from
B-types, which means it can set its best price for A-types (i.e., p∗A = uA − σ) separately from its best
(competitive) price for B-types (i.e., p∗A + p
∗
B = uA −∆ > uA − σ, so p∗B = σ −∆). This achieves the
same outcome as if M could use third-degree price discrimination, which is possible because B-types
always buy both A and BM from M due to the high shopping cost σ.
Finally, the equilibrium in the proposition still holds even if λA = 0, so that there are no A-types.
However, in that case equilibrium prices are not uniquely defined. Nevertheless, all equilibria result in
the same profits. Specifically, M could either choose (i) pA = uA−σ and pB = σ−∆ as in Proposition
1 or (ii) uA − σ < pA ≤ uA and pB = uA −∆ − pA, in which case consumers only want to buy A if
they also buy BM , and they compare buying A and BM with just buying BS from S. In this context,
adding some A-types creates a new role for M ’s price pA and eliminates the range of equilibria in
which uA − σ < pA ≤ uA.
4.2 Hosting
Now suppose S is hosted by M , meaning B-types can buy BS from S through M without incurring
the additional shopping cost σ. In the gym example, this means that the NYSC now hosts cycling
classes offered by Cyc Fitness, so a NYSC member interested in Cyc’s classes does not have to go to
a separate Cyc studio. We still allow S to sell directly, at price pS (Cyc Fitness did not stop offering
classes in its studio after being hosted by the NYSC).8 Meanwhile, let p̂S denote the price S charges
when it sells BS through M .
We assume there is a fixed cost of hosting, denoted F ≥ 0. For instance, hosting a specialized
cycling class in a gym may require re-arranging and customizing the space with the relevant equipment
and branding, as well as updating software systems for scheduling and reservations to include the
specialized class. Similarly, for a bank there could be significant system costs (software, compliance,
training) of allowing rival providers to sell their term deposits to its customers. Any negotiating and
legal costs associated with writing a hosting contract would also be included in F , as should anticipated
costs of integrating systems and employees more generally. In practice, both M and S may incur such
costs. Since throughout most of the paper we will focus on the solution in which a lump-sum transfer
can be made between the two firms (i.e. through a fixed fee), it will make no difference which firm
actually incurs the fixed costs of hosting. Thus, for convenience, we will assume F is always incurred
by M .
In equilibrium, S will only sell through M , so consumers will never multi-stop shop. The reason
is that selling directly has the disadvantage of having B-type consumers incur an additional shopping
cost σ or foregoing the additional utility uA − pA of being able to purchase A on M . Thus, selling
directly is less profitable for S than selling through M .
8The hosting equilibrium we derive in this section remains valid even if S no longer sells BS directly.
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By removing the additional shopping cost for consumers interested in both A and B, hosting puts
both firms on an even playing field when competing to make sales of B. Since ∆ > 0, in equilibrium
S always wins this competition, and sells BS to all B-types at p̂S = ∆, while pB = 0. On the other
hand, this leaves M free to sell A to both types of consumers, without worrying about how this affects
consumers’ willingness to buy from it versus S. Thus, one can think of hosting as leading M to
unbundle A and BM . In this case, A-types buy A provided pA ≤ uA − σ, and B-types will buy A
provided that pA ≤ uA and that they want to go to M in the first place, which they do since they
obtain a surplus of
uA + uB + ∆− pA − p̂S − σ = uA + uB − pA − σ ≥ uB − σ > 0.
Thus, M has two options. It can either set pA = uA − σ < uA and sell A to all consumers, obtaining
piM = uA − σ, or set pA = uA and sell A only to B-types, obtaining piM = λBuA. Using that
λA = 1− λB, we obtain the following result.9
Proposition 2 In the baseline model with hosting, there are two cases to consider:
• If λA ≤ σuA , the hosting equilibrium with the highest profit for M involves prices p∗A = uA,
p∗B = 0, and p̂
∗
S = p
∗
S = ∆. The A-types do not purchase, while the B-types all buy A and BS
through M . Profits are pi∗M = λBuA − F and pi∗S = λB∆.
• If λA > σuA , the equilibrium prices are p∗A = uA − σ, p∗B = 0, and p̂∗S = p∗S = ∆. The A-types
purchase A, and the B-types all buy A and BS through M . Profits are pi
∗
M = uA − σ − F and
pi∗S = λB∆.
The margin ∆ that S obtains on B-types reflects that under hosting, with no shopping cost
disadvantage, S has a competitive advantage of ∆ in selling B, which it can fully extract. By contrast,
recall that without hosting, S was at a shopping cost disadvantage and had to compete against the
bundle of A and BM , which prevented it from making any profit.
Under hosting, if M could engage in third-degree price discrimination, it would want to charge
uA − σ to A-types and uA to B-types (indeed, the B-types’ shopping costs are now covered by the
surplus offered by BS). However, given that S now competes and wins the market for B on the
platform created by M , such price discrimination is no longer possible. This drives a tradeoff between
hosting and non-hosting, which we will explore in the next section.10
An implicit assumption in our analysis above is that M does not remove BM when hosting S.
In any proposed equilibrium in which M does not compete by trying to sell BM (so that S has a
9Strictly speaking, here too there are other equilibria. These involve p∗B < 0 given that M does not sell BM in
equilibrium, and equilibria in which p∗S < p̂
∗
S given that S does not sell BS directly in equilibrium. Among all the
possible equilibria we focus on the best equilibrium for M (which also turns out to be the equilibrium that maximizes
joint profits). This avoids equilibria in which firms set prices (specifically, pB and pS) such that they would refuse to sell
if some consumers actually asked to purchase from them (i.e. off the equilibrium path).
10If instead M only sold a bundle of A and BM , it would choose between setting pAB = uA − σ and selling the bundle
to all consumers, or setting pAB = uA and selling the bundle to B-type consumers only. In either case it obtains no more
profit from bundling than in the equilibrium described in the proposition above.
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monopoly over product B), clearly M can do better by offering BM .
11 Thus, the only way M would
not offer BM is if it could commit ex-ante to not offer it. This would always increase joint profits in
our baseline model. However, this may not be possible in practice if it requires M to write a contract
specifying that it will not compete with S on M ’s platform. Indeed, this type of contract would likely
raise antitrust concerns because it could be viewed as a form of collusion. A commitment to remove
BM may therefore require a technological commitment, which may not always be feasible. Even if such
a commitment is feasible, it may not be jointly profitable once firms take into account the realistic
possibility that other firms would then want to enter to sell B. This is indeed the situation when there
are multiple specialists competing, which we consider in Section 5.2.
4.3 Unilateral incentive to host
We initially consider whether M is better off with hosting or without hosting, while ignoring the
possibility of any transfer payments between the firms. This allows us to provide some initial intuition
about the tradeoffs associated with hosting. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 In the baseline model without any transfer payments between the firms, hosting is
preferred by M if and only if λA ≤ σuA and ∆ >
λA(uA−σ)+F
1−λA , and hosting is always preferred by S.
It is easiest to interpret this result when there are almost no A-types, i.e. when λA → 0. Then,
hosting allows M to increase its profit by ∆, so hosting is preferred provided ∆ exceeds the fixed
cost F of hosting. The gain of ∆ that M obtains from hosting comes from a gain of σ on the A
product and a loss of σ−∆ on the B product (which is smaller). Indeed, hosting allows M to charge
uA for A instead of uA − σ, because shopping costs are now taken care of by S through the surplus
obtained from BS . This is the sense in which hosting S (and thereby eliminating the shopping cost
necessary to access BS) allows M to gain by turning a substitute into a complement. This captures
the fundamental benefit of hosting a rival of superior quality for M : it increases the value derived by
consumers from visiting M . In our simple model, M can only capture this value by raising its price
pA (because demand of each type of consumer is inelastic), but in reality, this could simply result in
higher demand even if M does not raise its price.
On the other hand, under hosting M no longer extracts σ−∆ from its sale of BM as sales of B are
now made by S. Thus, turning competition for the market into competition within the market means
that M gives up on its profit in the B market. Put differently, hosting unbundles the products and
levels the playing field in product B competition, which means M can no longer make a profit on B.
In contrast, S can now extract the profit λB∆, selling BS to B-types, which is why it strictly prefers
hosting.
Now consider what happens when there are some (but not too many) A-types, so λA ≤ σuA . In
this case, if M charges uA for A instead of uA− σ, it loses the A-types, who no longer purchase. This
means the additional surplus extracted by M from product A under hosting may no longer dominate
11This is reminiscent of the results in Carlton et al. (2010).
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the negative effect of hosting on M ’s profit in the B market. Put differently, the presence of A-types
constrains M ’s ability to extract more from product A under hosting since A-types do not care about
the extra surplus generated from hosting S’s superior version of product B. Thus, M can be worse
off under hosting even without taking into account the fixed costs of hosting. This happens when the
loss of B-type sales under hosting (which recall is equal to σ −∆) is large, i.e. when ∆ is small.
Finally, consider the case when there are many A-types, so λA >
σ
uA
. Then M will not want to
increase pA at all as a result of hosting since it does not want to give up on selling to the A-types,
and so there is no gain on product A from hosting to offset the loss on product B. In this case,
hosting always lowers M ’s profit, reflecting M ’s inability to price discriminate across the two types of
consumers by charging more to B-types through pB when it hosts.
The logic here bears some similarity with that of bundling. Shopping costs give to the multi-
product firm M a competitive edge over single-product firms whenever products A and B are bought
together by the consumer. At the same time, however, non-hosting puts competitive pressure on
the monopolized product A, just like bundling does (see Whinston, 1990). Hosting (like unbundling)
relaxes this competitive pressure.
The logic of our results does not depend on the stark prediction that hosting is unilaterally prof-
itable for M only if A-types stop purchasing. To show this, in Section C of the Online Appendix, we
provide an extension of our baseline model to allow for A-types to have elastic demand (i.e. different
willingness to pay for product A). We show that by increasing the willingness to pay of B-types,
hosting allows M to raise its price for product A and therefore can be unilaterally profitable even
though only some A-types stop purchasing.
4.4 Joint incentives to host without monitoring
So far we have ignored any transfer payments that could be made between the firms. Suppose M
cannot monitor sales by S and charge for them, which could be because the monitoring technology
is too costly to implement or because S does not want to share customer transaction data with M .
Suppose, however, that firms can make lump-sum transfers. Then hosting will arise whenever the two
firms can be made jointly better off with hosting, after taking into account the fixed costs of hosting.
Throughout the rest of the paper we will focus on the impact of hosting on the firms’ joint profit. For
our baseline setting, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 In the baseline model with no variable fees in the hosting contract, hosting is jointly
preferred if and only if (i) λA ≤ σuA and ∆ > σ2 +
F−(σ−λAuA)
2(1−λA) , or (ii) λA >
σ
uA
and ∆ > σ2 +
F
2(1−λA) .
Comparing Proposition 4 with Proposition 3, it is clear that the tradeoff between hosting and
non-hosting in terms of joint profits is similar to the one when we focused only on M ’s profit. The
only difference is that now under hosting we must add S’s profit λB∆, which expands the region of
parameter values for which hosting dominates. Specifically, if ∆ > σ2 , then hosting raises joint profits,
so in this case it always dominates non-hosting for F sufficiently small.12 This extends to the case
12The impact of hosting on consumer surplus and welfare is explored in Online Appendix D.
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we ruled out by assumption, namely ∆ > σ, i.e. S’s efficiency advantage is so high that it more
than offsets the shopping cost advantage of M . In that case, aside from the fixed cost F , there is no
downside to hosting given that M does not sell B either way (with or without hosting). In particular,
it is easily shown that, when ∆ > σ, hosting is jointly preferred if λBσ + max {σ − λAuA, 0} > F .
The tradeoff between hosting and non-hosting in Proposition 4 shifts towards hosting when ∆
increases and towards non-hosting when λA, F or uA increase. When σ increases, the tradeoff shifts
towards hosting if λA ≤ σuA and towards non-hosting if λA > σuA . To understand why the tradeoff is
non-monotonic in the level of the shopping cost σ, note that without hosting, because M is able to
price discriminate, the amount it collects is lowered by the shopping cost for the A-types only (i.e.
by λAσ). On the other hand, under hosting, if M wants to sell to A-types, it has to lower its price
by σ on all consumers. This means when there are relatively many A-types, so they are served by M
under hosting, a higher σ shifts the tradeoff in favor of non-hosting. On the other hand, when there
are relatively few A-types, so M gives up selling to them under hosting, a higher σ shifts the tradeoff
in favor of hosting.
4.5 Joint incentives to host with monitoring
Suppose now that M is able to monitor S’s sales through M and charge for them, which we assumed
was not possible previously. This means M can also set a per-transaction fee (or variable fee) τ in
addition to a lump-sum fee in the hosting contract, so that S pays τ to M for each unit it sells on M .
The timing remains as before: after the contract is specified (including variable and lump-sum fees),
the two firms set their prices simultaneously, taking the variable fee τ specified in the contract as given.
The pricing game given τ turns out to have multiple equilibria: to keep the analysis streamlined, we
always select the equilibrium that maximizes joint profits of M and S for every given τ . In the
appendix we prove the following result.
Proposition 5 In the baseline model, when M can specify a variable fee τ to charge S and a lump-sum
transfer in the hosting contract, an optimal variable fee is τ∗ = σ.
• If λA ≤ σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , then equilibrium prices p∗A = uA, p∗B = min {σ, uB − σ} and p̂∗S =
min {σ, uB − σ}+ ∆ yield the highest joint profit that can be achieved in the hosting equilibrium,
equal to λB (uA + ∆ + min {σ, uB − σ}) − F . Hosting is jointly preferred if and only if ∆ >
F−(σ−λAuA+(1−λA) min{0,uB−2σ})
2(1−λA) .
• If λA > σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , then equilibrium prices p∗A = uA−σ, p∗B = σ and p̂∗S = σ+ ∆ yield the
highest joint profit that can be achieved in the hosting equilibrium, equal to uA−σ+λB (σ + ∆)−
F . Hosting is jointly preferred if and only if ∆ > F2(1−λA) .
Comparing Proposition 5 with Proposition 4, it can be shown that the possibility of using a
variable fee unambiguously shifts the tradeoff towards hosting. Hosting S and charging it a variable
fee τ = σ allows M to preserve the same competitive edge as without hosting while relaxing the
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competitive pressure on good A.13 Thus, joint profits under hosting increase as a result of using
variable fees. It turns out the use of variable fees increases joint profits under hosting such that we
now need F > 0 for the tradeoff to be non-trivial: if F = 0, then hosting is always jointly preferred
when M can charge a variable fee. The reason is that the variable fee τ is another instrument that M
can use to price discriminate between A-types and B-types whenever M chooses to keep selling to A-
types: τ allows M to extract the increase in surplus offered to B-types by S’s superior product. Thus,
τ makes up for the loss of the ability to price discriminate using the price pB for BM . Meanwhile, M
can use pB to control any double marginalization problem that would otherwise arise with variable
fees.
As in the case without variable fees, the tradeoff between hosting and non-hosting in Proposition 5
shifts towards hosting when ∆ increases and towards non-hosting when λA, F increase. The effect of an
increase in uA is to shift the tradeoff towards non-hosting if λA ≤ σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , but otherwise it has
no effect on the tradeoff. This is the same as the case without variable fees, except the cutoff value of λA
for which an increase in uA shifts the tradeoff towards non-hosting is higher (i.e. when λA ≤ σuA ). The
only qualitative differences compared to the case without variable fees are the tradeoffs with respect
to increases in σ and uB. Recall without variable fees an increase in σ shifted the tradeoff towards
hosting if λA ≤ σuA and towards non-hosting if λA > σuA . With variable fees, in the parameter range
λA <
σ+min{0,uB−2σ}
uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , an increase in σ similarly shifts the tradeoff towards hosting except if uB < 2σ
and λA >
1
2 in which case an increase in σ shifts the tradeoff towards non-hosting. On the other hand,
in the parameter range λA >
σ+min{0,uB−2σ}
uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , the tradeoff no longer changes when σ increases. The
reason is that now, under hosting, M can use the variable fee to extract an additional margin of σ
from B-types, which is the same margin S could extract under non-hosting. Finally, without variable
fees, uB had no impact on the tradeoff because it was always competed away by Betrand competition
between S and M on the platform. With variable fees, if uB < 2σ and λA ≤ σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , then
the tradeoff shifts towards hosting if uB increases (otherwise, uB has no effect on the tradeoff). The
reason is that in this case, under hosting, uB is small enough that S and M together extract the entire
surplus from B-type consumers.
5 Extensions
In this section we consider two important extensions of the baseline model. These address two lim-
itations of the benchmark model. The first is that hosting always dominates once firms are allowed
sufficient contracting instruments, absent any fixed cost of hosting. The second is that we only allowed
for one specialist, but in reality firms may often host multiple specialists.
To address the first limitation, we allow some consumers to have imperfect information about the
specialist’s existence, and show that hosting specialists may not always dominate, even if variable
fees can be used and even if there are no fixed costs associated with hosting. To address the second
13Note, however, that outside competition constrains the variable fee to be no more than σ, which prevents M from
achieving the vertically integrated monopoly solution.
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limitation, we discuss the reasons why a firm may want to host multiple specialists.
5.1 Hosting as information
So far we have assumed all consumers know about the existence of the specialist firm, but this is
of course not always the case. In fact, one of the key benefits of being hosted on a platform for a
specialist is to increase awareness of its services among the platform’s customers. For example, it is
likely that before hosting, some members of NYSC would not have heard of Cyc Fitness. However,
after hosting, by seeing Cyc located within NYSC, members will become aware of its offerings, and, if
they have an interest in cycling classes, will also find out its prices. To capture this situation within
our model, suppose that without hosting, a fraction η ∈ (0, 1) of B-type consumers are not informed
about the specialist’s existence. Once the specialist is hosted, consumers learn of its existence and
prices whenever they visit M . In particular, we assume that when consumers find out about S’s
existence upon visiting M , they also learn about its direct channel (outside M) and price charged
there.
In the case without hosting, given some of M ’s customers don’t know about S’s offering, they
will be willing to pay a higher price for M ’s second-rate product than they would if they knew about
the substitute specialist. This allows M to set a higher price for its version of B in the case without
hosting, but at the expense of losing informed consumers to S. Thus, if the fraction η of uninformed
consumers is small, M does not find it profitable to target uninformed consumers exclusively by setting
a high price, thereby giving up selling BM to informed consumers. Therefore the equilibrium is the
same as with fully informed consumers in this case. On the other hand, if the fraction of uninformed
consumers is sufficiently high, starting from this pure-strategy equilibrium, M would prefer to increase
pB all the way to uB in order to extract the entire surplus of uninformed consumers, thus giving up on
selling to the informed B-types. However, this cannot be an equilibrium since S would best respond
by setting a higher price, which would then entice M to once again try selling to informed B-types.
Instead, there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium where both M and S randomize over the price
of their respective versions of B, while M still sells A to all consumers by setting pA = uA− σ. In the
parameter range on which this mixed strategy equilibrium prevails, both firms obtain higher expected
profits than in the benchmark case, reflecting that the presence of uninformed consumers relaxes price
competition. In contrast, by promoting the specialist, hosting removes the friction that prevented S
from reaching all consumers, thereby intensifying competition.
Taking into account this effect, and that the profits under hosting are unchanged compared to the
full information case (given in the hosting equilibrium all B-type consumers shop at M and so become
informed of S), we can then compare joint profits under hosting with non-hosting. The full details
(and proofs) are in Section E of the Online Appendix, which includes the results for the case in which
the firms cannot use a variable fee and the case in which they can. Here we focus on the result for
the most interesting case in which the firms can use a variable fee, given this was the case in which
previously hosting always dominated in the absence of any fixed cost of hosting.
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Proposition 6 Suppose a fraction η of B-type consumers are uninformed of S’s existence under non-
hosting, but they become informed about S under hosting if they visit M . When variable fees can be
used:
• If η ≤ σ−∆uB , the conditions for hosting to be jointly preferred are identical to those in Proposition
5.
• If η > σ−∆uB and λA ≤
σ+min{0,uB−2σ}
uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , hosting is jointly preferred if and only if
∆ >
F − (σ − λAuA)
η (1− λA) +
(2− η) (ηuB − σ)−min {0, uB − 2σ}
η
.
• If η > σ−∆uB and λA >
σ+min{0,uB−2σ}
uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , hosting is jointly preferred if and only if
∆ >
F
η (1− λA) +
(2− η) (ηuB − σ)
η
.
The first case in Proposition 6 is identical to the benchmark analysis (see Proposition 5) since
the equilibrium analysis with hosting is unchanged and the equilibrium analysis without hosting is
also unchanged when there are not many uninformed consumers, as explained above. In the second
and third cases in Proposition 6, we show in Section E of the Online Appendix that the tradeoff
unambiguously shifts in favor of non-hosting relative to the benchmark in Proposition 5. In particular,
in this case non-hosting can be jointly preferred even though M can use variable fees and even if there
is no fixed cost associated with hosting (i.e. if F = 0), provided η is high enough.
5.2 Multiple specialists
Thus far, we have focused on the case of a single specialist S. Obviously, in reality there may be
several competing specialists and M has a choice of how many of them to host. For instance, while
Salesforce hosts several third-party apps for consumer surveys (e.g. Survey Monkey, GetFeedback,
QuestionPro) and data management (e.g. CongaGrid, GridBuddy) that compete with functionality
included in Salesforce’s CRM product, there are other commonly used survey apps (e.g. SurveyGizmo,
KeySurvey, Praiseworthy) and data management apps (e.g. SAS) that are not hosted on AppExchange.
Nor does Salesforce’s platform host any competitor to its core CRM functionality, such as Pipeliner
CRM.14 Similarly, on its QuickBooks platform, Intuit hosts some third-party payroll management apps
(e.g. TimeTracker and TimeRewards) that compete with Intuit’s own Tsheets, but other prominent
alternatives to Tsheets (e.g. Hubstaff, Toggl, Freckle) are not hosted.15
Suppose there are multiple, identical competing specialists in our benchmark setting and the fixed
cost of hosting is independent of the number of hosted specialists. When no transfers are feasible
14See https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinecrandell/2014/12/06/salesforce-opens-the-door-to-
competitors/#b54699f18c34
15See https://blog.hubstaff.com/tsheets-alternatives/
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between the firms, M is weakly better off hosting two or more specialists rather than one. This is
because the hosted specialists compete away their value added ∆, which means M can extract all the
surplus from B-types created by hosting if it chooses not to serve A-types. If M chooses to serve
A-types, then hosting one or more specialists yields the same profits since M cannot charge more than
uA − σ for product A. When lump-sum transfers are feasible but variable fees are not, hosting one
specialist is weakly better from a joint profit perspective than hosting two or more specialists. The
reason is that now, if M chooses not to serve A-types, then M and the hosted specialist(s) together
always extract the entire hosting surplus from B-types. However, if M chooses to serve A-types,
joint profits are higher with one hosted specialist because it can extract λB∆ from B-types, whereas
competing hosted specialists extract nothing. When both fixed transfers and variable fees are feasible,
then joint profits are the same regardless of how many specialists are hosted. The reason is that M
can use the variable fee τ to offset competition among specialists on its platform.16 Thus, in our
benchmark setting, there is no joint gain from hosting more than one specialist.
Richer settings can make hosting multiple specialists jointly profitable. First, if the specialists are
horizontally differentiated, being able to give consumers access to as many different specialists on M
will raise consumers’ willingness to pay for A. This leads M to want to host as many specialists as
possible. Another reason for doing so is network effects: inviting multiple differentiated specialists
(that appeal to different consumers) attracts more consumers, and these additional consumers make it
more attractive for specialists to be hosted by the platform, and so on. Third, if there is uncertainty
over how the specialists will perform when hosted, then hosting as many specialists as possible helps
maximize the chance that at least one specialist performs well.17
On the other hand, there may also be reasons for restricting the number of hosted specialists that
are not captured in our benchmark model. Two obvious reasons are capacity constraints (e.g. a
gym can only host a limited number of specialist fitness studios) and the cost of dealing with each
additional specialist (e.g. writing and enforcing hosting contracts if they cannot be standardized,
managing technological integrations and customer support). A more interesting reason arises when
the specialists need to make relationship-specific investments. In that case, having more specialists
increases competition among them, which reduces each individual specialist’s incentive to invest in
the first place. In such contexts, the platform may want to restrict the number of specialists so as to
balance the benefits of product diversity and lower prices for consumers with the specialists’ investment
incentives.
6 Managerial implications
There are several factors that determine whether a multiproduct firm can gain by hosting a rival
specialist to sell over its common infrastructure, thereby creating a platform.
Regardless of whether firms can make use of fixed transfers or variable fees based on monitoring
transactions on the platform, our results imply that the multiproduct firm M should host a rival when
16We prove these claims formally in the Online Appendix, at the end of Section F.
17We formally analyze this case in Section F of the Online Appendix.
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the fraction of consumers who value both the core-product and the specialist product is high (i.e. there
are many B-type consumers), when the added value of the specialist’s version of the product is high
(i.e. ∆ is high), when the utility that consumers get from the core product is low (i.e. uA is low), and
when the fixed cost of hosting is low (i.e. F is low). If there are sufficiently many consumers who value
both products, then hosting should be preferred when consumers benefit more from one-stop shopping
(i.e. when σ is high). This helps explain for example why big box gyms (like the New York Sports
Club) are increasingly willing to host specialty fitness studios (like the Cyc) under revenue sharing
contracts: many users are interested in both standard gym amenities (e.g. weight equipment) and
specialized classes (e.g. cycling), and there is a clear benefit from having both collocated. However,
if there are a lot of consumers who are interested in the core product A only and M cannot monitor
transactions and charge a variable fee, the tradeoff between hosting and non-hosting actually shifts
towards non-hosting when shopping costs are high.18
Unsurprisingly, we find that the ability to monitor the rival’s transactions on the platform, and
so charge it a variable fee, makes hosting more profitable. With ongoing improvements in monitoring
technologies, we therefore expect to see such hosting become more prevalent over time, i.e. a greater
number of firms turning their products into platforms.
An important factor that makes hosting a less desirable choice is if many consumers are uninformed
about the specialist firm in the absence of hosting. In this case, hosting can intensify competition
between the firms by making consumers informed about the specialist rival’s existence. Of course, in
reality, consumers may already have partial information about the specialist rival before hosting, but
it can still be that hosting makes them realize just how good the specialist is, which otherwise they
would not know. More generally, to the extent hosting helps provide new and positive information
about the specialist, that should make hosting less appealing for M . In the case of Salesforce, for
example, their CRM customers might be skeptical of a newcomer like Pipeliner CRM (and they may
worry it would be hard to switch over to Pipeliner), but if Salesforce hosted Pipeliner, they would
realize how easy it is to switch and use Pipeliner.
Finally, our results showed that M ’s decision to host rivals also depends on the availability of
multiple competing specialists. The existence of two or more competing specialists makes it less likely
that M will host: indeed, hosting is no longer sufficient to avoid head-to-head competition because
competition will continue to exist outside of the platform. In this case, hosting many specialists raises
the value of the platform but it also intensifies on-platform competition, so it should be desirable
provided the platform has sufficient instruments to extract the resulting surplus. This seems to be
the case for Apple’s iPhone App Store: if Apple hosts rival app developers for a product category,
then it is open to all such qualified apps. Clearly, Apple has instruments to extract surplus from
these rivals, such as taking a cut on all app purchases (including in-app purchases), as well as via
taking a share of their advertising revenues. On the other hand, if the platform does not have enough
pricing instruments or pricing power to extract surplus from the hosted firms, and shopping costs are
18To understand this last result, note that since M cannot price discriminate under hosting, it will have to lower its
price by the shopping cost on all consumers if it wants to keep selling to A-types, which it does when there are a lot of
them.
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sufficiently low, firms should limit how many specialists are hosted in order to avoid having multiple
high-quality specialists on the platform that compete away the additional surplus they offer. For
instance, on its QuickBooks Capital lending marketplace for its QuickBooks small business customers,
Intuit only allows a limited number of selected lenders in order to avoid aggressive price competition
(i.e. competition on loan rates).
7 Future directions
Our paper is the first to provide a formal analysis of how a multiproduct firm can create a platform by
hosting rivals. Naturally, there are other factors relevant to the decision whether or not to become a
platform in this way that we did not capture. Thus, there are many interesting extensions that future
research can explore.
A key benefit of hosting that our model does not capture is that by inviting multiple differentiated
specialists (that appeal to different consumers), the platform can attract more consumers, and these
additional consumers make it more attractive for specialists to be hosted by the platform, and so
on. The resulting network effects can reinforce the benefits of hosting. However, since the benefits
obtained by network effects are fairly well understood, we chose to abstract from them in the current
paper, for simplicity.
On the other hand, even when firms can use transaction fees, if hosted specialists are unwilling
or unable to charge different prices on M relative to their prices outside M (perhaps because they
have a sufficiently large base of customers who they sell to directly), then M can no longer charge
very high variable fees under hosting. This in turn may make hosting jointly less profitable relative to
non-hosting.
There are also several longer-term risks associated with hosting which we have not considered in our
formal modelling, but which could be considered in future work. Hosting may allow the multiproduct
firm to learn from the rival specialist, after which it can offer its own better version, thus making the
specialist regret the hosting partnership. One could argue Amazon has done this to some extent, by
starting to sell certain product in its own name after seeing them become popular thanks to the sales
efforts of third-party sellers on its marketplace. Thus, specialists need to protect themselves against
this risk if the advantage they offer can be easily copied. Conversely, by being hosted, the specialist
might be able to learn how to provide the multiproduct firm’s core product (e.g. by obtaining access
to its customers), which can allow it to supplant the multiproduct firm itself. Finally, hosting may
also subject each party to a hold-up risk to the extent they each need to incur some non-recoverable
fixed costs of setting up, and so would make the firms vulnerable to ex-post exploitation via contract
renegotiation.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof or Proposition 1
First, we show why the prices in Proposition 1 characterize an equilibrium. Note the price p∗A leaves A-
type consumers indifferent between buying and not buying. In equilibrium the surplus of B-types is v∗B =
uA+uB−p∗A−p∗B−σ = uB + ∆−σ > 0 since σ < uB , which just makes B-type consumers indifferent between
buying A and BM , buying BS alone, or buying A and BS . If B-type consumers instead just buy BM their
surplus is uB − p∗B − σ = uB + ∆− 2σ, which is lower than v∗B since σ > 0.
Obviously, S cannot do better lowering its price (and making a loss) or raising its price (since it still will
not sell to any consumers). Since B-types just care about the total price pA + pB charged for A and BM , M
always does better setting the maximum price possible to sell to the A-types and adjusting pB so as to compete
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with S. If M raises pA it will lose A-type consumers, and also lose B-type consumers unless it lowers pB by a
corresponding amount, which would imply no gain in profit from the B-types. Similarly, lowering pA will cause
M to make less from the A-type consumers, and also to make less from the B-type consumers unless it raises
pB by a corresponding amount, which implies no gain in profit from the B-types. The same logic applies for
a deviation in pB , which requires M make an offsetting adjustment in pA in order to keep consumers, which
either causes A-type consumers to drop out (if pA is higher) or for M to make less profit from A-types (if pA is
lower). Note that requiring consumers to buy the bundle of A and BM also wouldn’t help since B-types already
buy the bundle and A-types would not want to buy the bundle at the equilibrium prices, and furthermore, M
cannot induce either type to pay more than they are currently paying by offering the two products as a bundle.
Thus, neither firm has a profitable deviation.
We now rule out other possible equilibria. Obviously p∗A ≤ uA, otherwise M would obtain no profit given
that it has an inferior version of B. We can then rule out any equilibrium with pA > uA−σ. Indeed, in this case
A-type consumers do not buy anything and the B-type consumers would not get a positive surplus from just
buying A from M . Thus, in equilibrium, these consumers either buy A and BM from M , obtaining a surplus
of uA + uB − pA − pB − σ, or just BS from S, obtaining a surplus of uB + ∆− pS − σ. Given uA > ∆, in the
proposed equilibrium we must have pS = 0, and pA + pB = uA −∆, giving M a profit of λB (uA −∆). But by
deviating to p∗A and p
∗
B given in the proposition, M can obtain pi
∗
M , which is strictly higher since it also sells to
the A-types.
The remaining possibility is an equilibrium in which pA ≤ uA − σ so that both types of consumers would
always want to buy A. There cannot be an equilibrium involving the B-types buying BS , since even if pS = 0,
M can always do better selling to B-types by setting the positive price pB = σ − ∆ to extract additional
revenue by inducing these consumers to buy BM , while keeping the price for A unchanged. Finally, note that
in equilibrium we cannot have pA < uA − σ since M always does better setting the maximum price possible to
sell to the A-types (i.e. pA = uA−σ) and adjusting pB so as to compete with S, given B-types only care about
the total amount they pay for A and BM .
8.2 Proof of Propositions 2 – 5
We assume M can charge S a variable fee τ per transaction when S is hosted (i.e. the setting of Section 4.5).
Then the result without any transfer between the firms (or with a fixed transfer only) is obtained at the end by
setting τ = 0.
Consider the case with hosting. We start by solving for the equilibrium in the second stage for a given
τ . If τ > σ, then S prefers to sell directly instead of through M , and then the outcome is the same as under
non-hosting. Thus, we focus on τ ≤ σ. The simpler case with τ = 0, which establishes Proposition 2, will
be discussed at the end. In equilibrium, S must sell BS to all B types through M because this is how it can
offer the highest utility for the B product. There are two cases depending on pA. (Throughout this proof
and subsequent proofs characterizing the hosting equilibrium we ignore the fixed cost of hosting F , since it is
irrelevant for the analysis, but we do consider it when determining the tradeoff with non-hosting.)
Suppose first that pA = uA − σ, so M sells A to both A types and B types (there is no incentive to set pA
any lower to sell to all consumers). In this case, for B type consumers to prefer buying A from M and BS from
S on M rather than buying A and BM from M or buying A from M and BS from S outside M , we must have:
uB + ∆− p̂S ≥ max {uB − pB , uB + ∆− pS − σ} .
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Clearly, this must hold with equality in equilibrium, otherwise S could increase p̂S . Thus, we must have
p̂S = min {pB + ∆, pS + σ} .
If pS + σ < pB + ∆, then we would have p̂S = pS + σ and S could profitably increase p̂S and pS by the same
amount. Thus, we must have pS + σ ≥ pB + ∆ and therefore
p̂S = pB + ∆.
Combined with τ ≤ σ, this implies that
p̂S − τ = pB + ∆− τ ≥ pB + ∆− σ,
so S does not want to deviate by setting pS slightly below pB + ∆− σ and a sufficiently high p̂S , such that B
types prefer to buy BS from S outside M .
Furthermore, τ must not be above p̂S (so S makes non-negative profits) and M must not want to deviate
by slightly decreasing pB and selling BM instead of getting τ from S. This means we must have
pB ≤ τ ≤ pB + ∆.
Finally, M must not want to increase pA and only serve B types. The best such deviation for M is to set
p′A such that
uA − p′A + uB + ∆− p̂S − σ = uB + ∆− σ − pS ,
provided p′A ≤ uA. So the best deviation is
p′A = uA + min {0, pS − pB −∆} .
Note that p′A ≥ uA−σ because pS+σ ≥ pB+∆. Deviation profits are therefore λB (uA + min {0, pS − pB −∆}+ τ),
whereas M ’s equilibrium profits are uA − σ + λBτ . For the deviation not to be profitable, we need
σ − λAuA
1− λA + min {0, pS − pB −∆} ≤ 0.
S’s profits are λB (pB + ∆− τ). Since neither profit depends on pS , we can always choose the lowest possible
pS , i.e. pS = pB + ∆ − σ, so this equilibrium always exists because σ−λAuA1−λA < σ. And since joint profits are
increasing in pB , we can focus on the equilibrium with the highest joint profits, which involves pB = τ . This
implies p̂S = τ + ∆ and pS = τ + ∆− σ, so M ’s profits are uA − σ + λBτ , while S’s profits are λB∆.
Next, suppose uA − σ < pA ≤ uA, so M only sells to B types. For B types to prefer buying A from M and
BS from S on M rather than buying A and BM from M or just buying BS from S outside M , we must have:
uA − pA + uB + ∆− p̂S − σ ≥ max {uA − pA + uB − pB − σ, uB + ∆− pS − σ} . (1)
In this case we must also worry about consumers’ non-negative utility constraint
uA − pA + uB + ∆− p̂S − σ ≥ 0.
If this constraint is not binding, as in the previous case, the condition (1) must hold with equality in equilibrium,
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so
p̂S = min {pB + ∆, uA − pA + pS} ,
and for the same reason as in the previous case, we must have uA − pA + pS ≥ pB + ∆. If the non-negative
utility constraint is binding, S cannot raise p̂S and sell on the platform, irrespective of the value of pB . So we
can set pB = p̂S − ∆ (the maximal possible price for BM ) without affecting equilibrium conditions. Thus in
both cases, we have
p̂S = pB + ∆.
Then the non-negative utility constraint is equivalent to
uA − pA + uB − pB − σ ≥ 0. (2)
Also, given τ ≤ σ, as in the previous case, S does not want to deviate by setting pS slightly below pB+∆−σ
and a sufficiently high p̂S , such that B types prefer to buy BS from S outside M . Combined with the fact that
S makes no sales at pS in equilibrium, this implies that joint equilibrium profits are maximized by setting pS
sufficiently high that it places no constraint on other equilibrium prices.
Furthermore, as in the previous case, we must have
pB ≤ τ ≤ pB + ∆.
Equilibrium profits are λB (pA + τ) for M and λB (pB + ∆− τ) for S. Clearly, M benefits from increasing
pA as much as possible subject to pA ≤ uA and (2),19 which means pA = uA + min {0, uB − pB − σ}. Thus,
maximal equilibrium profits are λB (uA + min {0, uB − pB − σ}+ τ) for M and λB (pB + ∆− τ) for S. If
uB ≥ τ + σ, then M ’s profits are λB (uA + τ) for all pB ≤ τ and since S’s profits are increasing in pB , we
set pB to the highest possible value in order to maximize joint profits, i.e. pB = τ . Joint profits are then
λB (uA + τ + ∆). If uB < τ + σ, then joint profits are increasing in pB for pB ≤ uB − σ and constant in
pB for uB − σ ≤ pB ≤ τ . Again, we choose pB to maximize joint profits subject to the constraints we have
determined so far, so without loss of generality from a joint profit perspective, pB = uB − σ (note that among
the prices pB that maximizes joint profits, this is the price that yields the highest profits for M). In this case,
joint profits are λB (uA + uB + ∆− σ). Combining the two cases, pA = uA, pB = min {τ, uB − σ}, profits for
M are λB (uA + τ) and profits for S are λB (min {0, uB − σ − τ}+ ∆).
Finally, M must not want to decrease pA to uA−σ and sell A to all consumers. This deviation would result
in profits uA−σ+λBτ , whereas M ’s equilibrium profits are λB (uA + τ) in both cases above. For this deviation
not to be profitable we must have σ ≥ λAuA.
We conclude that the equilibrium in which M only sells to B types exists if and only σ ≥ λAuA and the
maximum joint profits that can be attained in this equilibrium are λB (uA + ∆ + min {uB − σ, τ}).
Since joint profits are increasing in τ for both the equilibrium in which M sells to both types of con-
sumers and the equilibrium in which M just sells to B types, M will set the highest possible τ compatible
with hosting, which is τ = σ. Then the equilibrium with M selling to both A types and B types yields
joint profits uA − σ + λB (σ + ∆), whereas the equilibrium with M selling to B types only yields joint profits
λB (uA + ∆ + min{σ, uB − σ}) whenever it exists, i.e. whenever σ ≥ λAuA. The latter equilibrium has higher
joint profits whenever
λA <
σ + min {0, uB − 2σ}
uA + min {0, uB − 2σ} ≤
σ
uA
.
19Indeed, as noted above, pS can be set sufficiently high such that the constraint uA − pA + pS ≥ pB + ∆ is never
binding.
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In conclusion:
• If λA ≤ σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , then the highest equilibrium joint profit under hosting is λB (uA + ∆ + min {σ, uB − σ}).
Comparing with the equilibrium joint profits without hosting uA−σ+λB (σ −∆), and taking into account
the fixed cost of hosting F , hosting is preferred if and only if ∆ > F−(σ−λAuA+(1−λA) min{0,uB−2σ})2(1−λA) .
• If λA > σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , then the highest equilibrium joint profit under hosting is uA − σ+ λB (σ + ∆).
In this case, hosting is preferred if and only if ∆ > F2(1−λA) .
Finally, to obtain the results for the case in which variable fees are not feasible (Propositions 2, 3 and 4),
we can simply use the above analysis for the case τ = 0. The equilibrium in which M sells to both types of
consumers always exists and involves pA = uA− σ, pB = 0, p̂S = ∆ and pS = ∆− σ, so M ’s profits are uA− σ,
while S’s profits are λB∆. The equilibrium in which M only sells to B types exists if and only if σ ≥ λAuA and
involves pA = uA, pB = 0, p̂S = ∆ and pS ≥ ∆, so M ’s profits are λBuA, while S’s profits are λB∆. Thus:
• If σ ≥ λAuA, then the highest equilibrium joint profit under hosting is λB (uA + ∆). In this case, hosting
is preferred if and only if ∆ > λA(uA−σ)+F2(1−λA) .
• If σ < λAuA, then the highest equilibrium joint profit under hosting is uA−σ+λB∆. In this case, hosting
is preferred if and only if ∆ > σ2 +
F
2(1−λA) .
8.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We prove that the equilibrium outcome and profits under hosting are the same as in the benchmark setting
(Propositions 2 and 5). Indeed, if M sets pA ≤ uA − σ and so sells to all consumers, then all consumers will
be informed when deciding which version of B to buy and from where. Thus, everything is the same as in the
analysis of hosting in the benchmark setting. The other case is when M sets pA > uA − σ. The 1− η informed
consumers have the same options as before. The η uninformed consumers only consider whether to go to M
and buy both A and BM . However, in order for M to be able to somehow extract more from these consumers,
it would need to attract them. But when these consumers arrive at M , they will find out about S, and they
will have the same options of choosing to purchase BS instead of BM if M tries to extract more from them
(e.g., if it sets a higher τ in its contract and a higher pB). This reflects that this was the relevant constraint
on M ’s pricing before, and ensured that τ ≤ σ. There is no new price deviation for M that would allow it to
exploit the uninformed consumers. (Note the possibility of M setting τ to make it impossible for S to compete
on M would just cause everything to revert to the non-hosting outcome. If joint profits are higher in this case,
M would not want to host in the first place, so it doesn’t make sense to consider such a τ .) As a result, the
equilibrium is the same as in the benchmark model.
The result then follows from the comparison between the hosting profits given in Proposition 5 and the
profits without hosting derived in Proposition 11 of the Online Appendix.
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Online Appendix
This online appendix contains the formal details for various results noted in the main text, and
the proofs behind some of the results and claims in the main text.
A Correlation in consumers’ valuations across products
In the benchmark model, we assumed both types of consumers value A the same. We now explore what
happens when the two types of consumers place different values on product A in the case without variable fees.
Specifically, we assume B-types continue to value product A at uA, but A-types value it at uA + α. We will
consider both the case when α is positive (i.e. there is negative correlation between the values different types
of consumers place on products A and B) and the case α is negative (i.e. there is positive correlation between
the values different types of consumers place on products A and B).
A.1 Negative correlation
Suppose 0 < α ≤ σ, so A-types are willing to pay α more for product A than are B-types. This captures the
idea that there are some consumers who value A highly and do not need B (e.g. they may be serious body
builders who go to the gym only to use the weightlifting equipment and have no time for cycling), while others
are interested in both A and B, but value A relatively less (e.g. they go to the gym to for a variety of workouts).
Comparing joint profits under hosting and without hosting, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7 If λA ≤ σ−αuA , then hosting is jointly preferred iff ∆ >
λA(uA+α−σ)+F
2(1−λA) . If λA >
σ−α
uA
, then
hosting is jointly preferred iff ∆ > σ−α2 +
F
2(1−λA) .
Proof. Consider first what happens without hosting. Note if M charges a price of pA, A-type consumers will
buy A provided pA ≤ uA + α − σ. The choices of B-types is the same as our previous analysis with α = 0.
Recall M competes by selling both A and BM to B-types. This allows it to increase its price to A-types to
their maximum willingness to pay (now uA + α − σ), while still giving exactly the same surplus to B-types as
before. Thus, without hosting there is a unique equilibrium outcome in which the prices are p∗A = uA + α− σ,
p∗B = σ − α−∆, p∗S = 0. The A-type consumers always purchase A, and the B-type consumers all buy A and
BM from M . Profits are pi
∗
M = uA − σ + λAα + λB (σ −∆) and pi∗S = 0. The proof follows the same steps as
the proof of Proposition 1. As before, M cannot do better deviating. Note this remains true even if p∗B < 0. If
M sets pA = uA − σ and sets a high pB to induce multi-stop shopping, it will be worse off, since M would give
up α on A-types and σ −∆ > 0 on B-types. Moreover, the same alternative possibilities for equilibria can be
ruled out using the same arguments as before, since M always does better setting the maximum price possible
to sell to the A-types and adjusting pB so as to compete with S. This logic, also rules out any equilibrium with
a price uA − σ < pA < uA + α− σ.
With hosting a similar tradeoff arises to before (i.e. whether to sell to all consumers or just B-types), except
now the benefit of keeping A-type consumers is greater given they are willing to pay for product A. As before M
has two options. Either it can set pA = uA+α−σ < uA and sell A to all consumers, obtaining piM = uA+α−σ,
or set pA = uA and sell A only to B-types, obtaining piM = λBuA. Then, we find (i) if λA ≤ σ−αuA , the selected
equilibrium involves the prices p∗A = uA, p
∗
B = 0, and p̂
∗
S = ∆, the A-type consumers do not purchase, while the
B-type consumers all buy A and BS through M , and profits are pi
∗
M = λBuA and pi
∗
S = λB∆; (ii) if λA >
σ−α
uA
,
the selected equilibrium involves the prices p∗A = uA+α−σ, p∗B = 0, and p̂∗S = ∆, the A-type consumers always
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purchase A, and the B-type consumers all buy A and BS through M , and profits are pi
∗
M = uA + α − σ and
pi∗S = λB∆.
The proposition follows by comparing the joint profit worked out above under hosting with joint profit under
non-hosting, and taking into account the fixed cost of hosting F .
The tradeoff is similar to before, but there are some changes to note. The non-hosting profit extracted by
M from B-types is not affected by α, since M can price discriminate: this means M ’s profit is just higher by
the additional α obtained from A-types. By contrast, under hosting, the fact that α > 0 means A-types are less
of a constraint on the amount that M can extract from B-types since A-types are willing to pay more for A.
This improves the profitability of hosting, unless M no longer wants to serve A-types under hosting, in which
case M gives up more by hosting.
Consistent with this logic, a comparison of the regions under which hosting makes the firms jointly better
off shows that hosting dominates for a larger range of ∆ when M still sells to A-types (this occurs for large α),
but dominates for a smaller range of ∆ when M stops selling A-types (this occurs for small α). In the extreme
case when α = σ, the shopping cost is offset by the extra benefit that A-types get from product A, so A-types
do not constrain at all the amount that M can extract from B-types even if it cannot price discriminate. Thus,
apart from the fixed costs of hosting, hosting always dominates when α = σ as there is no other cost to hosting.
A.2 Positive correlation
Suppose instead that α < 0, so B-type consumers are willing to pay more for both products than A-type
consumers. Comparing joint profits under hosting and without hosting, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 8 If λA < − αuA−σ , then hosting is jointly preferred iff ∆ > F2(1−λA) . If − αuA−σ ≤ λA ≤ σ−αuA ,
then hosting is jointly preferred iff ∆ > λA(uA−σ+α)+F2(1−λA) +
α
2 . If λA >
σ−α
uA
, then hosting is jointly preferred iff
∆ > σ2 +
F
2(1−λA) .
Proof. Consider first what happens without hosting. The equilibrium prices with non-hosting must satisfy
p∗B ≤ σ − ∆ in order for B-type consumers to prefer buying BM to BS , and p∗A + p∗B ≤ uA − ∆ in order for
B-type consumers to prefer buying A and BM instead of just BS , and p
∗
A ≤ uA + α − σ if M sells to A-types
or p∗A ≤ uA if M just sells to B-types. The new equilibria are characterized by:
NH-1 If λA (σ − uA) ≤ α < 0 (or equivalently, λA ≥ − αuA−σ ), then p∗A = uA+α−σ, p∗B = σ−∆, p∗S = 0, with A-
types still purchasing, andB-types buying the bundle fromM , with profits being pi∗M = uA+α−λAσ−λB∆
and pi∗S = 0.
NH-2 If α < λA (σ − uA) < 0 (or equivalently, λA < − αuA−σ ), then M gives up on selling to A-types, uA − σ ≤
p∗A ≤ uA and p∗A + p∗B = uA − ∆, p∗S = 0, with B-types buying the bundle from M , with profits being
pi∗M = λB (uA −∆) and pi∗S = 0.
With hosting, the previous analysis with α ≥ 0 still holds, so the profit is defined in the proof of Proposition
7, in which there are two cases:
H-1 If λA ≤ σ−αuA , profits are pi∗M = λBuA and pi∗S = λB∆.
H-2 If λA >
σ−α
uA
, profits are pi∗M = uA + α− σ and pi∗S = λB∆.
Note that uA + α > σ (which is required for A-types to be willing to participate) implies the threshold
− αuA−σ is smaller than the threshold σ−αuA . Therefore, we have three cases when comparing the joint profits
under hosting with non-hosting.
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• If λA < − αuA−σ , then NH-2 and H-1 apply, so we can compare λB (uA + ∆) − F under hosting with
λB (uA −∆) without hosting.
• If − αuA−σ ≤ λA ≤ σ−αuA , then NH-1 and H-1 apply, so we can compare λB (uA + ∆) − F under hosting
with uA + α− λAσ − λB∆ without hosting.
• If λA > σ−αuA , then NH-1 and H-2 apply, so we can compare uA + α − σ + λB∆ − F under hosting with
uA + α− λAσ − λB∆ without hosting.
The proposition follows by comparing the joint profit worked out above under hosting with joint profit under
non-hosting.
The previous logic and tradeoff still apply. This suggests that α < 0 tightens the constraint coming from
A-types in the hosting equilibrium, thus making hosting less profitable. On the other hand, this also means
that M loses less when it stops selling to A-types, which tends to make hosting more profitable. Finally, there
is a novel effect when α < 0: under non-hosting pB is now constrained by competition in B (previously this
constraint was not binding so M could adjust pA and pB to extract the maximum surplus from B-types). This
limits M ’s ability to price discriminate, which previously was the key benefit provided by non-hosting. If α is
sufficiently negative, then M no longer serves A-types under non-hosting, so in this case, if F = 0, then hosting
always dominates. If M keeps selling to A-types under non-hosting, M ’s limited ability to benefit from price
discrimination shifts the tradeoff in favor of hosting.
B Horizontal differentiation with respect to product B
Our results do not depend crucially on the assumption that B-type consumers are all the same. Consider the
variation from our baseline model in which B-type consumers have heterogeneous tastes over products BM
and BS . Specifically, suppose B-type consumers value BM and BS at uB and uB + ∆ respectively, less their
individual mismatch cost. Their mismatch cost is tx if purchasing BM and t (1− x) if purchasing BS for a
consumer located at x, where consumers have x drawn from U [0, 1]. Thus, we model heterogeneous tastes using
the standard Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. Other than this, we retain the assumptions
of our baseline specification, and add a condition on the mismatch parameter t so that the market for B is
always covered (t is not too high) and a condition on t so that both firms obtain positive markets shares in
equilibrium both with and without hosting (t is not too low). Then we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Suppose there is horizontal differentiation for product B, with the mismatch parameter t sat-
isfying max
(
σ−∆
3 ,
∆
3
)
< t < 2uB3 + min
{
σ−∆
9 ,
∆
3
}
. When λA ≤ σuA , hosting is jointly preferred iff ∆ >
σ
2 +
9t(λAuA−σ+F )
2σ(1−λA) . When λA >
σ
uA
, hosting is jointly preferred iff ∆ > σ2 +
9tF
2σ(1−λA) .
Proof. First consider the case without hosting. Note that pA ≤ uA otherwise M never sells A. We can also
rule out M setting pA such that uA − σ < pA ≤ uA, so A-types do not buy A. Suppose there is an equilibrium
with this property. In this case B-types would not get a positive surplus from just buying A from M . Therefore,
they either buy A and BM from M or just BS from S. It is straightforward to check that M will always prefer
to set p′A = uA − σ so as to sell to the A-types, and adjust the price for pB to sell the bundle A and BM at the
same joint price pA + pB as in the proposed equilibrium, which it can always do by setting a higher price for
pB .
Given pA ≤ uA−σ, we know A-types will purchase and B-types who prefer to buy BS will choose to multi-
stop shop rather than one-stop shop at S. In this case, M does best setting pA = uA − σ, and the two firms’
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respective profits are piM = pA +λBpB
(
1
2 +
pS−pB+σ−∆
2t
)
and piS = λBpS
(
1
2 − pS−pB+σ−∆2t
)
. The equilibrium
involves p∗A = uA−σ, p∗B = t+ σ−∆3 , p∗S = t− σ−∆3 , pi∗M = uA−σ+2tλB
(
1
2 +
σ−∆
6t
)2
and pi∗S = 2tλB
(
1
2 − σ−∆6t
)2
.
It is straightforward to check that our assumptions on t imply S can earn a non-negative profit at these prices,
both firms get some share of the B market, and the market is covered, and moreover that there is no profitable
deviation for either firm.
Now suppose S is hosted by M . For the standard reasons, if λA >
σ
uA
, M will set pA = uA − σ and sell
A to everyone, while if λA ≤ σuA , M will set pA = uA and sell only to B-types. In either case, the equilibrium
involves p∗B = t− ∆3 and p̂∗S = t+ ∆3 . As a result, if M sets pA = uA, profit are piM = λBuA + 2tλB
(
1
2 − ∆6t
)2
and pi∗S = 2tλB
(
1
2 +
∆
6t
)2
, while if M sets pA = uA − σ, profits are pi∗M = uA − σ + 2tλB
(
1
2 − ∆6t
)2
and
pi∗S = 2tλB
(
1
2 +
∆
6t
)2
. Our assumption on t ensures the market is covered, both firms get some share of the
B market, and there is no profitable deviation for each firm. Note checking that there is no profitable deviation
also requires checking that S would never want to set pS < p̂
∗
S to induce some multi-stop shopping or some
buyers to one-stop shop at S. Doing so will not attract any consumers to multi-stop shop unless pS < p̂
∗
S − σ.
Since all B-type consumers buy A, to the extent they get some surplus from buying A, getting consumers to
one-stop shop at S instead of at M will also require pS < p̂
∗
S − (uA − pA). In both cases, S could attract more
additional consumers by lowering p̂S instead of pS by the given amount. The fact it doesn’t want to (i.e. that
p̂∗S is the equilibrium level of pS) implies it also cannot be better off lowering pS below p̂
∗
S .
The proposition follows by comparing the joint profit worked out above under hosting with joint profit under
non-hosting, taking into account the fixed cost of hosting F .
Note that the right-hand side in the tradeoff is always increasing in λA and F , which is consistent with
the logic of the baseline model, namely that hosting is less likely for high λA and high F . If λA ≤ σuA , the
right-hand side in the tradeoff is also increasing in uA and decreasing in σ, which is also consistent with the logic
in the baseline model. On the other hand, if λA >
σ
uA
, the right-hand side in the tradeoff may be increasing or
decreasing in σ, whereas in the baseline model it was always increasing. Finally, note the right-hand side of the
tradeoff can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of product differentiation t when λA <
σ
uA
but is always
increasing in the degree of product differentiation when λA >
σ
uA
.
C Elastic demand by A-types
In this section we extend our analysis to the case in which A-types have elastic demand. We show that, in
contrast to our benchmark setting, hosting may be unilaterally profitable without the full exclusion of A-types.
Suppose λA consumers get uA+δ−y from consuming A, where uA > σ, δ > 0, and y is distributed with the
weakly concave smooth distribution G [0, uA + δ]. Note δ > 0 ensures that some A-types value product A more
than B-types, so that the introduction of elastic demand by A-types does not have to imply lower willingness
to pay by A-types. As before, λB consumers get uA > σ from consuming A, uB > σ from consuming BM and
uS = uB + ∆ from consuming BS , where σ > ∆ ≥ 0. We assume
arg max
pA
{pAG (uA + δ − σ − pA)} ≤ uA, (C.1)
so the unconstrained price to maximize revenue from A-types is no more than uA. This is a reasonable and
simple condition to rule out equilibria in which M only sells to A-types, both with hosting and without hosting.
Note with linear G, it just requires δ ≤ uA + σ.
For conciseness, we assume in this section that there is no fixed cost of hosting, F = 0.
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C.1 Non-hosting
Without hosting, the only equilibrium is one in which A-types with y ≤ uA + δ − σ − pA buy from A, and the
remainder do not, while B-types buy A and B from M and S sets p∗S = 0. In this equilibrium, M chooses
p∗A = arg max
pA≤uA+min{0,δ−σ}
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λB min {uA −∆, pA + σ −∆}}
p∗B = min {uA −∆− p∗A, σ −∆} .
The corresponding profit for M is
pi∗M = λAp
∗
AG (uA + δ − σ − p∗A) + λB min {uA −∆, p∗A + σ −∆} .
Note the equilibrium implies two possible outcomes: uA−σ < p∗A ≤ uA+min {0, δ − σ} so that p∗B = uA−∆−p∗A,
or p∗A ≤ uA − σ so that p∗B = σ −∆.
To show this is an equilibrium, we need to check that M cannot profitably deviate (clearly, there is no
profitable deviation for S). First, M cannot do better if it just gives up on selling BM but continues to sell A
to B-types. Indeed, profits in such a deviation would be
max
pA≤uA−σ
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λBpA} < pi∗M ,
since σ > ∆.
Second, M cannot do better giving up on selling to B-types and just setting the unrestricted pA to
maximize its revenue from selling to A-types only. Indeed, consider the revenue-maximizing deviation price
p′A = arg maxpA {pAG (uA + δ − σ − pA)}. By assumption (C.1), we must have p′A ≤ uA. Furthermore,
we must also have p′A < uA + δ − σ, otherwise demand from A-types would be zero. Thus, we must have
p′A ≤ uA + min {0, δ − σ}. But this means the deviation cannot be profitable since
pi∗M = max
pA≤uA+min{0,δ−σ}
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λB min {uA −∆, pA + σ −∆}}
> max
pA≤uA+min{0,δ−σ}
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA)} .
Thus, there is no profitable deviation from the proposed equilibrium.
Next we show that there are no equilibria involving (i) pA > uA + min {0, δ − σ} or (ii) M only selling to
A-types.
Suppose there is an equilibrium with pA > uA+ min {0, δ − σ}. If pA > uA+ max {0, δ − σ}, then M makes
no sales of A whatsoever, which cannot be an equilibrium (M could lower pA until either some A-types or some
B-types buy A). Thus, there are two remaining possibilities. If uA < pA ≤ uA+δ−σ, then M makes no sales of A
to B-types and therefore no sales of BM either. Then M ’s profits are λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA), and assumption
(C.1) implies that they can be increased by setting p′A ≤ uA. The second possibility is uA + δ − σ < pA ≤ uA.
In this case, no A-types purchase from M and B-types either purchase both A and BM from M or purchase
nothing from M (indeed, B-types never purchase A alone given uA + δ − σ < pA, and they don’t purchase B
alone in equilibrium either given S offers a superior version of the B product). If B-types do not purchase from
M , then M can always do better lowering its price pA and at least selling to A-types. Suppose then that in the
proposed equilibrium M sells both A and BM to B-types, so S is not selling anything, and in the equilibrium
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sets pS = 0. We must therefore have
uA + uB − pA − pB − σ ≥ uB − σ + ∆ > 0
uA ≥ pA > uA + δ − σ
uB ≥ pB .
Note that the first two sets of inequalities imply pB < σ − ∆ − δ and pA ≤ uA − pB − ∆. But now M can
do better by decreasing pA slightly below uA + δ − σ to attract some A-types and increase pB by an offsetting
amount so as to not change the total utility offered to B-types (i.e. so as not to lose any B-types) provided
B-types still want to buy BM at this higher price. To see this is possible, note that the proposed equilibrium
prices satisfy uA − pB − ∆ ≥ pA > uA + δ − σ. Thus, we know the required increase in pB will not be
greater than (uA − pB −∆)− (uA + δ − σ) = −pB −∆− δ + σ. The deviation p′B will therefore be lower than
pB − pB − ∆ − δ + σ = σ − ∆ − δ < uB , so this profitable deviation is indeed possible, which rules out the
proposed equilibrium.
Finally, suppose there is an equilibrium in which M only sells to A-types. From the previous paragraph,
in which we ruled out any equilibrium with pA > uA + min {0, δ − σ}, we know that we must have pA ≤
uA + min {0, δ − σ}. But then, the strategy of selling to both A-types and B-types leading to pi∗M is strictly
better, so must represent a profitable deviation from any such proposed equilibrium.1
C.2 Hosting
Now consider the case in which S is hosted by M and there is no variable fee charged by M . As in the
benchmark case, in equilibrium S must win sales of B on M and we have p∗B = 0, and p̂
∗
S = p
∗
S = ∆. Thus,
M only sells A in equilibrium. Furthermore, (C.1) implies M does not want to set pA > uA and only sell to
A-types. There are then two possibilities in equilibrium: (i) M sells A to both A-types and B-types by setting
pA ≤ uA + min {0, δ − σ}, (ii) M sells to B-types only by setting uA + δ − σ < pA ≤ uA. Note that case (ii) is
only possible if δ < σ.
Consider case (i) first. In this equilibrium, M sets
p∗A = arg max
pA≤uA+min{0,δ−σ}
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λBpA} ,
and B-types prefer to buy A and BS at M . The resulting profit for M is
piM = max
pA≤uA+min{0,δ−σ}
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λBpA} .
If δ ≥ σ, then M cannot profitably deviate so this is clearly an equilibrium. If on the other hand δ < σ, then
M can deviate by setting uA + δ−σ < pA ≤ uA and thereby give up on A-types altogether. The best deviation
in this case is attained for pA = uA and yields profits λBuA. Thus, provided δ ≥ σ or
max
pA≤uA+δ−σ
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λBpA} ≥ λBuA, (C.2)
then the equilibrium is as characterized in (i).
1Recall, the equilibrium profits pi∗M were obtained assuming pS = 0. If instead, S sets pS > 0 in a proposed equilibrium
in which M only sells to A-types, this would make the deviation to sell to both types even more profitable.
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If instead δ < σ and
max
pA≤uA+δ−σ
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λBpA} < λBuA,
then the equilibrium is as characterized in (ii), i.e. M sets p∗A = uA and obtains profits piM = λBuA.
C.3 Comparison of hosting with non-hosting
In the benchmark setting, the only case in which hosting was unilaterally profitable for M is when λA ≤ σuA , and
in this case M gives up on selling to A-types. We want to show that when A-types have elastic demand, hosting
can now be unilaterally profitable without giving up on A-types altogether. Recall, there are two possible
outcomes under hosting, corresponding to cases (i) and (ii) in the hosting analysis. In case (ii), M gives up on
selling to A-types, so if M wants to host in this case, it is for a similar reason to that in the benchmark analysis.
The more interesting setting is case (i). In this case, hosting is unilaterally profitable for M iff
pi
(i)
A = max
pA≤uA+min{0,δ−σ}
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λBpA}
> pinhA = max
pA≤uA+min{0,δ−σ}
{λApAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) + λB min {uA −∆, pA + σ −∆}} .
We distinguish three cases.
In the first case, the value pMA maximizing pAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) exceeds uA−∆, which is indeed possible
if δ + ∆ > σ. Then hosting dominates non-hosting for all values of λA. In this case M benefits from being
able to extract more than uA −∆ from B-types under hosting, which it can do by setting a higher price for A
because shopping costs are now taken care of by S through the surplus obtained from BS . Thus, it sacrifices
some, but not all, demand from A-types.
The second case is when pMA < uA−∆ and δ > σ. Then for any λA, M sells to some A-types when hosting.
Notice that the optimal prices under hosting and non-hosting are both non-increasing with λA and above uA −
σ for the same interval of values of λA.
2 On this interval, the price under non-hosting is max
{
uA − σ, pMA
}
while
the price under hosting decreases with λA until it reaches uA (recall that pAG (uA + δ − σ − pA) is weakly
concave). Hosting can only dominate if λA is small enough that hosting induces an optimal price p
∗
A > uA−∆. On
this range,
(
pi
(i)
A − pinhA
)
/λA is decreasing (the slope is (uA −∆− p∗A) /λ2A) and is positive for small λA, so that
hosting dominates non-hosting for λA below a positive threshold.
The last case is when pMA < uA − ∆ and δ < σ. The analysis is the same as in the previous case except
that when λA increases, it reaches a level at which the case (ii) prevails. Depending on parameters values, the
range of values of λA where hosting prevails and M sells to A-types may or may not be empty (as confirmed
by solving the case when G is linear, with details available from the authors upon request).
D Consumer surplus and welfare
We evaluate the effect of hosting on consumer surplus and welfare in the benchmark case without variable fees,
which comes from a straightforward comparison of the equilibria defined in Propositions 1 and 2. The results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Consider the baseline model. If λA ≤ σuA , hosting lowers consumer surplus, and it increases
2If uA − σ ≤ pMA ≤ uA −∆, this is the case for all values of λA.
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total welfare if and only if ∆ > λA(uA−σ)+F1−λA . If λA >
σ
uA
, hosting raises consumer surplus, and it increases
total welfare if and only if ∆ > F1−λA .
The only parameter region where consumers are better off with hosting is the region in which M would
individually prefer not to host. The reason is that hosting constrains the ability of M to extract profit from
product A because M can no longer price discriminate. Only when this constraint is sufficiently important can
consumer surplus be higher. While hosting increases competition over product B, it may not increase overall
competition for the benefit of consumers when both products are taken into account.
It is intuitive that hosting increases total welfare by eliminating the additional shopping cost for B-type
consumers to get A and BS . This gives B-types an additional utility of ∆ compared to when they were buying
A and BM without hosting. Other than the fixed cost F , the only other downside of hosting occurs when M
stops selling to A-types, which happens when ∆ is not very high. In this case, welfare can be lower with hosting
even in the absence of any fixed cost (i.e. F = 0).
Thus, it is possible that hosting is jointly profitable but leads to lower total welfare. This happens when
λA ≤ σuA and λA2(1−λA) (uA − σ) < ∆ < λA1−λA (uA − σ). Conversely, it is possible that hosting is not jointly
profitable but leads to higher total welfare: this happens when λA >
σ
uA
and ∆ < σ2 .
E Hosting as information
We start by considering the case without hosting. The coexistence of informed and uninformed consumers
implies that for some parameter range there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. In that case, we determine the
(unique) equilibrium in mixed strategies. The following proposition summarizes the outcome without hosting.
Proposition 11 When a fraction η of B-type consumers are uninformed of S’s existence, the non-hosting
equilibrium is determined as follows:
• For η ≤ σ−∆uB , the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies and is identical to the benchmark case (see
Proposition 1).
• For η > σ−∆uB , the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies and involves pA = uA− σ, pB drawn from the
CDF
GB (pB) =
pB − ηuB
pB − σ + ∆
with support pB ∈ [ηuB , uB ] and a mass point at pB = uB,
Pr (pB = uB) =
ηuB + ∆− σ
uB + ∆− σ < 1,
pS drawn from the CDF
GS (pS) = 1− η
1− η
uB + ∆− σ − pS
pS + σ −∆
with support pS ∈ [ηuB + ∆− σ, uB + ∆− σ]. Expected equilibrium profits are
piM = uA − σ + λBηuB
piS = λB (1− η) (ηuB + ∆− σ) .
Proof. We first show there cannot be any pure-strategy equilibrium in which M sells BM to uninformed B-
types only. We then characterize the conditions under which there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which M
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sells BM to both informed and uninformed B-types. Finally, we characterize the mixed-strategy equilibrium,
which turns out to exist if and only if the pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist.
To show there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in which M sells BM to uninformed B-type consumers only,
note this can only be an equilibrium if M extracts the entire surplus from uninformed B-types, which means
we must have pA + pB = uA + uB − σ. Furthermore, M can extract the entire surplus from A-types by setting
pA = uA − σ and pB = uB . Given these prices, S’s best response is to price just below pS = uB + ∆ − σ,
which extracts almost the entire surplus from informed B-types. However, M could then deviate by slightly
lowering pB and attracting all informed B-type consumers as well, which results in a discrete increase in its
profits. Thus, this cannot be part of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Consider instead a possible pure-strategy equilibrium in which M sells to both informed and uninformed
B-types. There are two cases to consider within this scenario: (a) M sets pA = uA and only sells to B-types,
and (b) M sets pA = uA − σ and sells to both A-types and B-types. Case (a) is easily ruled out. Given that
M sells to both informed and uninformed B-types, for this to be an equilibrium, we must have pB = −∆ and
pS = 0, so M ’s profits are λB (uA −∆). But then M could deviate to pA = uA − σ and pB = σ − ∆, which
yields strictly higher profit uA − σ + λB (σ −∆).
Consider case (b) in which pA = uA − σ. We must have pS = 0 and pB = σ − ∆. Thus, profits are
piM = uA − σ + λB (σ −∆) and piS = 0. Clearly, S cannot profitably deviate. M has three possible deviations.
The first one is to set pB = uB in order to only attract the uninformed B-types, in which case it must keep
pA = uA−σ. This deviation yields profits uA−σ+λBηuB . The second possible deviation is to set pA > uA−σ
and pA + pB = uA −∆, which ensures that M still sells to all informed and uninformed B-types but no longer
sells to A-types. This yields profits λB (uA −∆), which can never be a profitable deviation. The third possible
deviation is to set pA > uA−σ and pA+pB = uA+uB−σ, which ensures thatM only sells to uninformed B-types.
This yields profits λBη (uA + uB − σ), which are lower than the profits obtained through the first deviation.
Thus, the pure-strategy equilibrium under case (b) exists if and only if uA−σ+λB (σ −∆) ≥ uA−σ+λBηuB ,
which is equivalent to η < σ−∆uB . Thus, the only possible pure-strategy equilibrium has pA = uA−σ, pB = σ−∆
and pS = 0, and it exists if and only if η ≤ σ−∆uB .
We next determine the mixed-strategy equilibria. Denote by GB the CDF of M ’s price distribution for pB
and by GS the CDF of S’s price distribution for pS . Again, there are two possibilities: (a) pA = uA, so M sells
only to B-types, and (b) pA = uA − σ so M sells to both A-types and some B-types.
As before we can rule out case (a) arising in equilibrium. To see this, suppose pA = uA, so we must have
pB ≤ uB − σ. In this case, for any pB that M plays with positive probability, its profit is
λB (uA + pB) (η + (1− η) Pr (pB < pS −∆)) = λB (uA + pB) (η + (1− η) (1−G (pB + ∆))) .
However, by setting pA = uA − σ and p˜B = pB + σ, the profit achieved by M becomes
uA − σ + λB p˜B (η + (1− η) (1−G (p˜B − σ + ∆)))
= uA − σ + λB (pB + σ) (η + (1− η) (1−G (pB + ∆))) ,
which is strictly higher. Thus, setting pA = uA cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Turning next to case (b), given pA = uA − σ, we must have pB ≤ uB . In particular, M can guarantee
profits uA − σ + λBηuB by setting pB = uB . This implies that M will never set pB below ηuB (even if it
attracted both informed and uninformed consumers at this price, it would not do better than ηuB in total
profits from selling BM ). Thus, the support of GB (.) is [ηuB , uB ]. This implies that the support of GS (.) is
[ηuB + ∆− σ, uB + ∆− σ].
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We determine GS (.) by imposing that any price pB in the support of GB yields the same profit as setting
pB = uB . This is equivalent to:
uA − σ + pBλB (η + (1− η) (1−GS (pB + ∆− σ))) = uA − σ + λBηuB .
Rearranging and with the change of variables pS ≡ pB + ∆− σ, this is equivalent to
GS (pS) = 1− η
1− η
uB + ∆− σ − pS
pS + σ −∆ .
Note GS (pS) is increasing in pS , and GS (uB + ∆− σ) = 1 and GS (ηuB + ∆− σ) = 0, so GS (.) has no mass
points.
Similarly, we determine GB (.) by imposing that any price pS in the support of GS yields the same profit
as setting pS = ηuB + ∆− σ, thereby capturing all the informed customers. This is equivalent to
λB (1− η) (1−GB (pS + σ −∆)) pS = λB (1− η) (ηuB + ∆− σ) .
Rearranging and with the change of variables pB ≡ pS −∆ + σ, this is equivalent to
GB (pB) =
pB − ηuB
pB − σ + ∆ .
Note that GB (ηuB) = 0. Furthermore, GB (pB) is increasing in pB if and only if η >
σ−∆
uB
. If η ≤ σ−∆uB ,
then GB (.) is weakly decreasing and therefore there is no mixed-strategy equilibrium. Note also that η >
σ−∆
uB
implies GB (uB) < 1, so there is a mass point at pB = uB ,
Pr (pB = uB) =
ηuB + ∆− σ
uB + ∆− σ < 1.
In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, expected profits are
piM = uA − σ + λBηuB
piS = λB (1− η) (ηuB + ∆− σ) .
Finally, we need to check that M cannot profitably deviate by setting pA = uA and thereby giving up selling
to A-types. If it did, then M would have to set pB ≤ uB − σ. When M sets pB , it sells to informed B-types
only if pS > pB + ∆. Thus, M ’s deviation profits as a function of pB are
(uA + pB)λB (η + (1− η) (1−GS (pB + ∆)))
= (uA + pB)λBη
uB
pB + σ
,
which is decreasing in pB . Thus, M ’s best deviation is to set pB = ηuB − σ. The deviation profits are then
λB (uA + ηuB − σ), which is clearly lower than the equilibrium profits uA − σ+ λBηuB . Thus, the deviation is
not profitable and the mixed-strategy equilibrium we have determined exists if and only if η > σ−∆uB .
Next consider the case with hosting. In principle, the fact that some consumers do not know about the
specialist’s existence before visiting M means that this scenario is somewhat different from the benchmark
hosting case, where all consumers were informed of S’s existence and presence on M even before going to M .
However, it turns out that this difference does not affect the analysis (since all consumers are induced to shop
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at M in any equilibrium, they all end up informed of S’s existence). Thus, the same hosting equilibrium as
in the benchmark case prevails—both with and without variables fees. For convenience, the next proposition
summarizes the joint profits under hosting for each case.
Proposition 12 When a fraction η of B-type consumers are uninformed of S’s existence, the hosting equilib-
rium and firm profits are the same as in the benchmark case:
• When M cannot monitor S’s sales and charge variable fees, if λA ≤ σuA , then joint profits in equilibrium
are λB (uA + ∆)− F , whereas if λA > σuA , then joint equilibrium profits are uA − σ + λB∆− F .
• When M can monitor S’s sales and charge variable fees, if λA ≤ σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , then joint profits are
λB (uA + ∆ + min {σ, uB − σ}) − F , whereas if λA > σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , then joint profits are uA − σ +
λB (σ + ∆)− F .
We can now compare the outcomes under hosting and non-hosting using the previous two propositions. The
first proposition below focuses on the case when variable fees cannot be used.
Proposition 13 Suppose a fraction η of B-type consumers are uninformed of S’s existence under non-hosting,
but they become informed about S under hosting if they visit M . When variable fees cannot be used:
• If η ≤ σ−∆uB , the conditions for hosting to be jointly preferred are identical to those in Proposition 4.
• If η > σ−∆uB and λA ≤ σuA , hosting is jointly preferred if and only if
∆ >
F − (σ − λAuA)
η (1− λA) +
(2− η) (ηuB − σ)
η
+
σ
η
.
• If η > σ−∆uB and λA > σuA , hosting is jointly preferred if and only if
∆ >
F
η (1− λA) +
(2− η) (ηuB − σ)
η
+
σ
η
.
The first case in Proposition 13 is identical to the benchmark analysis since, as explained above, the equilib-
rium analysis with hosting is unchanged and the equilibrium analysis without hosting is also unchanged when
there are not many uninformed consumers. In the remaining two cases in Proposition 13, when the fraction of
uninformed consumers is sufficiently high, the tradeoff unambiguously shifts towards non-hosting. To see this
note that joint profit is the same under hosting, but the joint profits without hosting are higher in Proposition
11 when η > σ−∆uB than they are in Proposition 1. When there are enough of them, the presence of uninformed
consumers softens the competition for B-types without hosting, reflecting that M will sometimes exploit the
uninformed B-types by setting a high price, and that S will best respond by also sometimes setting a high price
pS . In contrast, by promoting the specialist, hosting removes the friction that prevented S from reaching all
consumers, thereby intensifying competition.
The effect of the factors (uA, λA, F , σ and ∆) on the tradeoff between hosting and non-hosting in Proposition
13 is qualitatively the same as in Proposition 4, with two exceptions when η > σ−∆uB . First, when λA >
σ
uA
,
the tradeoff now shifts towards hosting when σ increases, reflecting that the shopping cost σ limits the surplus
that can be extracted from uninformed B-types when competition is relaxed. Second, an increase in uB now
affects the tradeoff, shifting it towards non-hosting. This reflects that with higher uB , the benefit of relaxing
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competition by focusing on exploiting uninformed B-types under non-hosting is higher since there is more
surplus that can be extracted from such consumers.
For the case in which variable fees can be used by M under hosting, we make the comparison based on
the joint profits under hosting (as specified in Proposition 5) with non-hosting (as given in Proposition 11).
The comparison is summarized by Proposition 6. To show that the tradeoff unambiguously shifts in favor of
non-hosting in Proposition 6 compared to in Proposition 5 in case η > σ−∆uB , note there are two cases.
Suppose λA ≤ σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} . If hosting is preferred in the case with η uninformed B-types, then
∆ >
F − (σ − λAuA)
η (1− λA) +
(2− η) (ηuB − σ)−min {0, uB − 2σ}
η
⇐⇒ η (1− λA) ∆ > F − (σ − λAuA) + (1− λA) (2− η) (ηuB − σ)− (1− λA) min {0, uB − 2σ}
⇐⇒ (η − 2) (1− λA) ∆ > F − (σ − λAuA)− 2∆ (1− λA) + (1− λA) (2− η) (ηuB − σ)− (1− λA) min {0, uB − 2σ}
⇐⇒ 2∆ (1− λA)− (F − (σ − λAuA)− (1− λA) min {0, uB − 2σ}) > (1− λA) (2− η) (ηuB − σ + ∆)
⇐⇒ ∆− F − (σ − λAuA)− (1− λA) min {0, uB − 2σ}
2 (1− λA) >
(2− η) (ηuB − σ + ∆)
2
> 0,
where the first inequality comes from Proposition 6, and the last inequality holds because σ−∆uB < η < 1. Thus,
we get that
∆ >
F − (σ − λAuA)− (1− λA) min {0, uB − 2σ}
2 (1− λA) ,
which shows that hosting is then also preferred in the case without any uninformed B-types.
Suppose alternatively that λA >
σ+min{0,uB−2σ}
uA+min{0,uB−2σ} . If hosting is preferred in the case with η uninformed
B-types, then following the same steps,
∆ >
F
η (1− λA) +
(2− η) (ηuB − σ)
η
⇐⇒ ∆− F
2 (1− λA) >
(2− η) (ηuB − σ + ∆)
2
> 0.
Thus, we get that
∆ >
F
2 (1− λA) ,
which shows that hosting is then also preferred in the case without any uninformed B-types.
Finally, we show how the comparative static results change in this case with uninformed B-types. The
effect of the factors (uA, λA, F , σ and ∆) on the tradeoff between hosting and non-hosting in Proposition 6 is
qualitatively the same as in the corresponding case with full information (Proposition 5), with two exceptions:
(i) when η > σ−∆uB , the tradeoff now always shifts towards hosting when σ increases, reflecting that the shopping
cost σ limits the surplus that can be extracted from uninformed B-types when competition is relaxed (with full
information, the tradeoff can shift towards non-hosting when σ increases), and (ii) when η > σ−∆uB and either
uB ≥ 2σ or λA > σ+min{0,uB−2σ}uA+min{0,uB−2σ} , an increase in uB shifts the tradeoff towards non-hosting as the benefit of
relaxing competition by focusing on exploiting uninformed B-types under non-hosting is higher since there is
more surplus that can be extracted from such consumers (with full information, uB had no effect on the tradeoff
in this parameter range).
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F Multiple specialists and uncertainty
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 specialists who offer uB + ∆ when visited outside M . When any of these specialists
is hosted, we also assume there is uncertainty regarding the value offered to M ’s customers: for each hosted
specialist, the value is uB + ∆ with probability θ and uB with probability 1 − θ, where the realizations for
different specialists are drawn independently and are the same for all consumers. This captures the general idea
that there may be uncertainty over how the specialists will perform when hosted. Specifically, firms may be
uncertain whether a given specialist’s value added is specific to its location or carries over when it is hosted on
M . This uncertainty is assumed to be resolved after the contract has been signed and the specialists have been
hosted. Thus, if M decides to host one or multiple specialists, we assume M must commit to the fixed transfer
and any variable fee τ before the uncertainty is resolved, while the firms set their prices (to consumers) after
the uncertainty is resolved. Finally, we assume the fixed cost of hosting is F regardless of how many specialists
are hosted. Note the case in which θ = 1 captures the simple extension of the benchmark model to allow for
multiple specialists (i.e. without uncertainty).
In the absence of hosting, allowing for multiple competing specialists does not change anything since in the
benchmark case the specialist was already at a disadvantage when competing against M for sales of B (given
∆ < σ). Thus, all specialists price at zero and make zero profits, whereas M sets pA = uA−σ and pB = σ−∆,
obtaining profits uA − σ + λB (σ −∆). This is the same outcome as in the benchmark case. With hosting, two
differences arise: competition outside the platform drives prices to zero, and two hosted specialists offering the
same value obtain zero profit. M must then decide how many specialists to host, and compare the resulting
joint profits with the no-hosting outcome in deciding whether to host them.
The next two propositions characterize the hosting outcome and provide the conditions for hosting to be
jointly preferred to non-hosting, first for the case when M cannot use variable fees under hosting (Proposition
14) and then for the case when M can use variable fees (Proposition 15). The proofs are provided at the end
of the section.
Proposition 14 Suppose there are n ≥ 2 specialists who offer uB +∆ when visited outside M , but when hosted
offer uB + ∆ with probability θ and uB with probability 1− θ. When variable fees cannot be used:
• If σ ≤ λAuA, then M prefers to host k∗ = arg maxk∈{1,2,...,n}
{
k (1− θ)k−1
}
specialists, and hosting is
jointly preferred if and only if
∆ >
σ (1− λA) + F
(1− λA)
(
1 + θk∗ (1− θ)k∗−1
) .
• If λAuA < σ < λAuA + λB∆, then M prefers to host
k∗ = arg max
k∈{1,2,...,n}
{
(1− θ)k (λAuA − σ) + kθ (1− θ)k−1 (λAuA − σ + λB∆)
}
specialists and hosting is jointly preferred if and only if
∆ >
σ (1− λA)−
(
1− (1− θ)k∗ − k∗θ (1− θ)k∗−1
)
(σ − λAuA) + F
(1− λA)
(
1 + k∗θ (1− θ)k∗−1
) .
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• If σ ≥ λAuA +λB∆, then M prefers to host all n specialists and hosting is jointly preferred if and only if
∆ >
λA (uA − σ) + F
(1− λA) (1− (1− θ)n) .
By ignoring integer constraints and focusing on the case in which M hosts specialists, we can gain more
insight into the optimal number of specialists to host. This is given by
k∗ =

− 1ln(1−θ) if σ ≤ λAuA
− 1ln(1−θ) + (1−θ)(σ−λAuA)θ(λAuA+λB∆−σ) if λAuA < σ < λAuA + λB∆
n if σ ≥ λAuA + λB∆
,
assuming k∗ belongs to [1, n] in each case. The optimal number of specialists to host is (weakly) increasing in
σ, and is decreasing in θ, ∆ and uA.
To understand the result, note first that if σ ≥ λAuA+λB∆, then shopping costs are so high that, regardless
of how many hosted specialists turn out to be of high value, M does best to sell A only to B-type consumers,
who have their shopping cost covered by buying the B product. In this case, all specialists make zero profits,
while M ’s profits are λBuA, except in the case when no hosted specialist turns out to be of high value, when
M ’s profits are λB (uA −∆). Thus, joint profits are higher when at least one of the specialists hosted on M
turns out to offer the added value ∆, because the hosted specialists free the platform from outside competitive
pressure on good A that arises when the value of good B is larger outside than inside. Since the probability of
at least one specialist turning out to offer high value is increasing in k, M will host all available specialists.
On the other hand, if σ ≤ λAuA, then shopping costs are so low that, regardless of how many hosted
specialists turn out to be of high value, M does best to sell A to all consumers by setting the price pA = uA−σ.
In this case, joint profits are the same (equal to uA − σ) across the different realizations, unless exactly one
hosted specialist turns out to offer high value—then the two firms can extract the additional value ∆ from
B-types since it will not be competed away. Thus, M chooses k to maximize the probability kθ (1− θ)k−1 of
exactly one specialist offering high value. The optimal k is therefore decreasing in the probability θ that any
individual specialist turns out to be of high value.
For intermediate levels of the shopping costs (i.e. λAuA < σ < λAuA + λB∆), M does best selling A only
to B-types when two or more specialists turn out to be of high value. Otherwise, M does best selling A to all
consumers. Thus, the only change relative to the case with low shopping costs is that now, when two or more
specialists turn out to be of high value, joint profits are higher, equal to λBuA instead of uA − σ. Since the
probability of two or more specialists turning out to be of high value is increasing in k,3 the optimal number of
specialists to host is higher than in the case with low shopping costs, but still possibly below n.
Consider now the case when M can charge variable fees under hosting.
Proposition 15 Suppose there are n ≥ 2 specialists who offer uB +∆ when visited outside M , but when hosted
offer uB + ∆ with probability θ and uB with probability 1− θ. When variable fees can be used under hosting, M
prefers hosting all n specialists and hosting is jointly preferred over non-hosting if and only if
∆ >
F
(1− λA) (1− (1− θ)n) .
Like in the benchmark case, hosting is always preferred if F = 0. This is not surprising: when variable fees
3Indeed, 1− (1− θ)k − kθ (1− θ)k−1 is increasing in k.
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can be used, whether only one or multiple hosted specialists have an efficiency advantage, M can always extract
the efficiency gain σ due to hosting by setting τ = σ.
The key difference relative to the benchmark model is that now, regardless of how many hosted specialists
turn out to be of high quality, they have to compete with the outside specialists of high quality that price at
cost. This explains why, going from the case with just one specialist (Proposition 5) to the case with two or
more competing specialists (Proposition 15), the tradeoff shifts towards non-hosting. This holds even if θ = 1,
i.e. there is no uncertainty over the added value of the specialists.
The presence of the competing outside specialists constrains the price of hosted specialists. Specifically, the
maximum price p̂S that can be charged by hosted specialist(s) of high quality is p̂S = σ if pA = uA − σ (so
M sells A to both types), or p̂S = 0 if pA = uA (so M sells A to B-types only). Clearly, in the latter case,
M cannot extract any variable fee from the hosted specialists because they would make a loss, whereas in the
former case, M can extract σ from them. Thus, it can never be profitable for M to only sell A to B-types by
setting pA > uA − σ, so the only possible equilibrium now must involve M selling A to both types.
This has two implications. First, M ’s profits are uA − σ + λBσ when at least one hosted specialist turns
out to be of high quality and uA − σ + λB (σ −∆) when none of the hosted specialists turns out to be of high
quality. Thus, M will host as many specialists as possible in order to maximize the chance that at least one
specialist will have an efficiency advantage. Second, the hosting vs. non-hosting tradeoff is very similar to the
case λA >
σ
uA
in the benchmark model, i.e. the case in which M sold to A-types in equilibrium. In particular,
σ has no effect on the tradeoff and the effects of the parameters ∆, λA and F are the same as in the benchmark
model. Furthermore, taking into account the fixed cost of hosting, the tradeoff shifts towards hosting when the
number of competing specialists increases, i.e. when n increases.
F.1 Proof of Propositions 14 and 15
We start with the more complicated case in which M can charge a variable fee τ when it hosts specialists, i.e.
Proposition 15. We then derive the proof of Proposition 14 from the equilibrium of the subgame in which τ = 0
under hosting.
Regardless of how many specialists are hosted, Bertrand competition outside the platform implies that in
equilibrium we can always restrict attention to the case where all specialists (hosted and not hosted) price at
zero outside the platform.
Suppose M hosts k ∈ [1, n] specialists and has set a variable fee τ ≥ 0 in its contract with the hosted
specialists. Given that all specialists are identical, there are only three distinct cases to consider: (i) all the
hosted specialists turn out to offer uB only, (ii) exactly one of the hosted specialists turns out to offer uB + ∆
and all other specialists offer uB only, (iii) two or more of the hosted specialists turn out to offer uB + ∆.
Consider case (i) first. If all hosted specialists turn out to offer only uB , then all specialists make zero profits
and the outcome is as follows:
• if τ ≥ σ−∆, then M keeps selling to both types and makes the sales of BM by setting pA = uA − σ and
pB = σ −∆, obtaining profits uA − σ + λB (σ −∆), which is the same as without hosting.
• if σ−λAuA1−λA −∆ ≤ τ < σ −∆, then M keeps selling to both types and makes the sale of BM by setting
pA = uA − σ and pB = τ , obtaining profits uA − σ + λBτ .
• if τ < σ−λAuA1−λA − ∆, then M sells to B types only by setting pA = uA − τ − ∆ and pB = τ , obtaining
profits λB (uA −∆).
Note that joint profits are (weakly) increasing in τ . They are maximized for τ ≥ σ − ∆, when they are
equal to uA − σ + λB (σ −∆).
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Consider case (ii), when exactly one of the hosted specialists turns out to offer uB + ∆. With some abuse
of terminology, we will refer to the specialist offering uB + ∆ as S. If τ > σ, then S cannot make non-negative
profits while avoiding that consumers prefer going to an outside specialist. The same goes for the other hosted
specialists. In this case, M sets pA = uA − σ and pB = σ −∆ and the outcome is the same as without hosting.
Suppose then τ ≤ σ. In equilibrium, S must sell BS to all B types because it can offer the highest utility
for the B product. All other hosted specialists price at τ on M . There are two cases depending on pA.
Suppose first that pA = uA − σ, so all consumers buy the A product (there is no need to set pA any lower
to attract all consumers). In this case, for S to make the sales of BS , we must have
uB + ∆− p̂S ≥ max {uB − pB , uB + ∆− σ} .
Clearly, this must hold with equality in equilibrium, otherwise S could increase p̂S . Thus, we must have
p̂S = min {pB + ∆, σ} .
Furthermore, τ must not be above p̂S (so S makes non-negative profits) and M must not want to deviate by
setting pB slightly below p̂S −∆ and selling BM instead of getting τ from S. This means we must have
min {pB , σ −∆} ≤ τ ≤ min {pB + ∆, σ} .
Finally, M must not want to increase pA and only serve B types. The best such deviation for M is to set p
′
A
such that
uA − p′A + uB + ∆− p̂S − σ = uB + ∆− σ,
provided the solution in p′A is below uA. So the best deviation is
p′A = uA − p̂S = uA −min {pB + ∆, σ} .
If pB ≥ σ−∆, then p′A = uA−σ, so this deviation does not do any better. If pB ≤ σ−∆, then p′A = uA−∆−pB ,
so M ’s deviation profits are λB (uA −∆− pB + τ), whereas M ’s equilibrium profits are uA − σ+ λBτ . For the
deviation not to be profitable, we then need
λAuA + λB (∆ + pB) ≥ σ.
Thus, if pB ≥ σ −∆, then (pA = uA − σ, p̂S = σ, pS = 0) is an equilibrium given τ if and only if
σ −∆ ≤ τ ≤ σ.
Equilibrium profits are uA − σ+ λBτ for M and λB (σ − τ) for S. Since these profits do not depend on pB , we
can just focus on pB = σ −∆.
If pB ≤ σ −∆, then (pA = uA − σ, p̂S = ∆ + pB , pS = 0) is an equilibrium given τ if and only if
pB ≤ τ ≤ pB + ∆ and λAuA + λB (∆ + pB) ≥ σ.
Since joint profits are increasing in pB , we focus on the highest possible pB , which is pB = min {τ, σ −∆}. If
σ −∆ ≤ τ , then pB = σ −∆, so this is the same equilibrium as in the case pB ≥ σ −∆. If σ −∆ > τ , then
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pB = τ and (pA = uA − σ, pB = τ, p̂S = ∆ + τ, pS = 0) is an equilibrium given τ if and only if
τ ≥ σ − λAuA
1− λA −∆.
In this equilibrium, profits are uA − σ + λBτ for M , λB∆ for S, and zero for all other specialists.
To conclude this case, the equilibrium with M selling to A-types exists if and only if τ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA −∆ and
profits are uA−σ+λBτ for M and λB min {∆, σ − τ} for S. Thus, joint profits are uA−σ+λB min {∆ + τ, σ}.
Suppose now uA− σ < pA ≤ uA, so M does not sell to A types. In this case, for S to make the sales of BS ,
we must have
uA − pA + uB + ∆− p̂S ≥ max {uA − pA + uB − pB , uB + ∆} .
Clearly, this must hold with equality in equilibrium, otherwise S could increase p̂S . Thus, we must have
p̂S = min {∆ + pB , uA − pA} .
Furthermore, τ must not be above p̂S (in order that S does not make a loss) and M must not want to deviate
by setting pB slightly below p̂S −∆ and selling BM instead of getting τ from S. This means we must have
min {pB , uA − pA −∆} ≤ τ ≤ min {∆ + pB , uA − pA}
Finally, M must not want to decrease pA to uA − σ and sell A to all consumers. This deviation would result in
profits uA − σ + λBτ , whereas M ’s equilibrium profits are λB (pA + τ). For this deviation not to be profitable
we must have
uA − pA ≤ σ − λAuA
1− λA .
There are two possibilities for this equilibrium:
• If pB ≤ uA − pA −∆, then this equilibrium exists if and only if
pB ≤ τ ≤ pB + ∆ and uA − pA ≤ σ − λAuA
1− λA .
Equilibrium profits are then λB (pA + τ) for M and λB (pB + ∆− τ) for S. Clearly, M would want to
increase pA as much as possible, so it must be that pA = uA − pB −∆. Thus, for any pB in the interval
[τ −∆, τ ], equilibrium profits are λB (uA − pB + τ −∆) for M and λB (pB + ∆− τ) for S, and this is an
equilibrium if and only if pB + ∆ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA . Thus, there exists a pB in the interval [τ −∆, τ ] such that
this is an equilibrium if and only τ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA . Note that joint profits are λBuA and so do not depend on
pB or τ .
• If pB ≥ uA − pA −∆, then this equilibrium exists if and only if
uA − pA −∆ ≤ τ ≤ uA − pA and uA − pA ≤ σ − λAuA
1− λA .
Equilibrium profits are then λB (pA + τ) for M and λB (uA − pA − τ) for S. Clearly, M would want to
increase pA as much as possible, so it must be that pA = uA− τ and profits are λBuA for M and 0 for S.
This is an equilibrium if and only if τ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA .
Combining these two possibilities, we conclude that the equilibrium in which M does not sell to A types
exists if and only if τ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA and joint profits in this equilibrium are always λBuA.
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Thus, summarizing case (ii), we find:
• If τ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA −∆, then only the equilibrium in which M does not sell to A types exists and joint profits
are λBuA (there are multiple equilibria depending on how profits are shared between M and S).
• If τ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA , then only the equilibrium in which M sells A types exists and joint profits are uA − σ +
λB min {∆ + τ, σ}.
• If σ−λAuA1−λA − ∆ ≤ τ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA , then both types of equilibria exist, so joint profits are either λBuA or
uA − σ + λB min {∆ + τ, σ}.
Clearly, joint profits are weakly increasing in τ , so they are maximized for τ = σ, which leads to profits
uA − λAσ for M and zero for S.
Finally, consider case (iii), in which two or more of the hosted specialists turn out to offer uB + ∆. In this
case, Bertrand competition pins down the prices of all the hosted specialists on M so that p̂S = τ , while Bertrand
competition outside M continues to pin down the specialists’ outside prices at pS = 0. As in the previous case,
if τ > σ, then the hosted specialists cannot compete with the outside specialists and make non-negative profits,
so the outcome is the same as under non-hosting. Suppose then τ ≤ σ. Then B-type consumers prefer buying
BS and A on M instead of only buying BS outside if and only if pA + τ ≤ uA.
Consider first the equilibrium when M sells to A types. Then pA = uA − σ, so clearly pA + τ ≤ uA. In this
candidate equilibrium, M makes profits uA − σ + λBτ . Note that in this case M does not want to deviate by
setting pB slightly below p̂S −∆ = τ −∆ and selling BM instead of getting τ from the hosted specialists. The
only remaining condition for ensuring this is an equilibrium is that M does not want to increase pA and only
serve B types. The best such deviation is to set p′A = uA− τ , leading to deviation profits λBuA. This deviation
is not profitable if and only if τ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA .
Next consider the equilibrium when M does not sell to A types. Then pA = uA − τ ≥ uA − σ. In this
candidate equilibrium, M makes profits λBuA. This is an equilibrium if and only if M does not want to deviate
by decreasing pA to uA − σ and serve both A types and B types. This condition is equivalent to τ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA .
Thus, summarizing case (iii):
• If τ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA , then there is a unique equilibrium in which M sells to A types by setting pA = uA − σ
and joint profits are uA − σ + λBτ
• If τ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA , then there is a unique equilibrium in whichM does not sell toA types involving pA = uA−τ
and joint profits are λBuA. Once again, joint profits are weakly increasing in τ and maximized for τ = σ,
when they are equal to uA − λAσ.
Consequently, joint profits are weakly increasing in τ up to τ = σ in all three scenarios that can occur after
uncertainty is realized. This implies that from an ex-ante perspective (before uncertainty is realized), M will
set τ = σ. Thus, when k ≥ 1 specialists are hosted, expected joint profits are
E [piM + piS ] = (1− θ)k (uA − σ + λB (σ −∆)) +
(
1− (1− θ)k
)
(uA − λAσ)
= uA − λAσ − (1− θ)k λB∆. (F.1)
Thus, joint profits are increasing in k, so from a joint profit perspective, M wants to host all n available
specialists in order to maximize the probability of having at least one specialist of high quality on the platform.
In this case, hosting is preferred to non-hosting if and only if
uA − λAσ − (1− θ)n λB∆− F > uA − σ + λB (σ −∆) ,
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which is equivalent to
∆ >
F
(1− λA) (1− (1− θ)n) .
Finally, if M cannot monitor the hosted specialists’ sales under hosting (Proposition 14), then the analysis
above applies by imposing τ = 0. The outcomes in the three cases above are now as follows:
• Case (i): none of the hosted specialists turn out to offer uB + ∆. In this case, all specialists make zero
profit. If ∆ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA , then M sells A to both types and joint profits are uA − σ. If ∆ < σ−λAuA1−λA , then
M sells to B types only by setting pA = uA −∆ and joint profits are λB (uA −∆). In short, joint profits
are max {uA − σ, λB (uA −∆)}.
• Case (ii): only one of the hosted specialists turns out to offer uB + ∆. In this case, if ∆ ≤ σ−λAuA1−λA ,
then only the equilibrium in which M sells exclusively to B types exists and joint profits are λBuA. If
σ ≤ λAuA, then only the equilibrium in which M sells to both A and B types exists and joint profits are
uA − σ + λB∆. If ∆ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA ≥ 0, then both types of equilibria exist, so joint profits are either λBuA
or uA − σ + λB∆. And since ∆ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA , we know that uA − σ + λB∆ ≥ λBuA, so we assume the two
firms coordinate on the equilibrium with higher joint profits, i.e. uA−σ+λB∆. Thus, to summarize this
case: joint profits are max {λBuA, uA − σ + λB∆}.
• Case (iii): two or more hosted specialists turn out to offer uB + ∆. In this case, if σ ≤ λAuA, then joint
profits are uA−σ; if σ ≥ λAuA, then joint profits are λBuA. In short, joint profits are max {uA − σ, λBuA}.
Consequently, expected joint profits are:
E [piM + piS ] = (1− θ)k max {uA − σ, λB (uA −∆)}+ k (1− θ)k−1 θmax {λBuA, uA − σ + λB∆}
+
(
1− (1− θ)k − kθ (1− θ)k−1
)
max {uA − σ, λBuA} . (F.2)
There are therefore three cases:
• If σ−λAuA1−λA ≥ ∆, then joint profits are
E [piM + piS ] = (1− θ)k λB (uA −∆) +
(
1− (1− θ)k
)
λBuA.
They are increasing in k, so joint profits are maximized by hosting all available specialists, i.e. k∗ = n.
In this case, hosting is jointly preferred to non-hosting if and only if
∆ >
λA (uA − σ) + F
(1− λA) (1− (1− θ)n) .
• If ∆ ≥ σ−λAuA1−λA ≥ 0, then joint profits are
E [piM + piS ] = (1− θ)k (uA − σ) + k (1− θ)k−1 θ (uA − σ + λB∆) +
(
1− (1− θ)k − k (1− θ)k−1 θ
)
λBuA
= k (1− θ)k−1 θ (λAuA − σ + λB∆)− (1− θ)k (σ − λAuA) + λBuA.
In this case, the optimal number of specialists to host from a joint profit perspective is
k∗ =
(1− θ) (σ − λAuA)
θ (λAuA − σ + λB∆) −
1
ln (1− θ)
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and hosting is preferred to non-hosting if and only if
∆ >
σ (1− λA)−
(
1− (1− θ)k∗ − k∗ (1− θ)k∗−1 θ
)
(σ − λAuA) + F(
1 + k∗ (1− θ)k∗−1 θ
)
(1− λA)
• If σ−λAuA1−λA ≤ 0, then joint profits are
E [piM + piS ] = k (1− θ)k−1 θ (uA − σ + λB∆) +
(
1− k (1− θ)k−1 θ
)
(uA − σ)
= k (1− θ)k−1 θλB∆ + uA − σ.
In this case, assuming θ < 1, the optimal number of specialists to host from a joint profit perspective is
k∗ = − 1
ln (1− θ)
and hosting is preferred to non-hosting if and only if
∆ >
σ (1− λA) + F(
1 + k∗ (1− θ)k∗−1 θ
)
(1− λA)
.
F.2 Proof of the results with multiple specialists and no uncertainty
Suppose θ = 1 in the above model with multiple specialists. If both lump-sum transfers and variable fees are
feasible, then (F.1) implies joint profits under hosting are
piM + piS = uA − λAσ,
so any k ≥ 1 yields the same joint profits.
If only lump-sum transfers are feasible, then (F.2) implies joint profits under hosting are
piM + piS =

max {uA − σ + λB∆, λBuA} if k = 1
max {uA − σ, λBuA} if k > 1
.
In this case, k = 1 is optimal under hosting, unless λBuA ≥ uA − σ + λB∆, in which case any k ≥ 1 yields the
same joint profits.
Finally, if neither lump-sum transfers nor variable fees are feasible, then M ’s profits under hosting are
piM =

max {uA − σ, λB (uA −∆)} if k = 1
max {uA − σ, λBuA} if k > 1
.
In this case, any k > 1 is optimal under hosting, unless uA − σ ≥ λBuA, in which case any k ≥ 1 yields the
same joint profits.
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